ABSTRACT Studies find evidence that opportunistic reporting often accompanies fair value measurement. However, research has not determined whether the source of this opportunism is the estimate of fair value. Using detailed information on insurers' investment holdings, we separate the use of fair value measurement discretion from the application of non-measurement-related discretion in accounting for impairments of financial assets. Our evidence contradicts the view that fair value measurement discretion plays a large role in opportunistic avoidance of impairment recognition for investment securities. Instead, managers appear to avoid recording impairment losses by opportunistically applying subjective criteria regarding perceived loss persistence and intent to hold. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: G20; G22; G30; M41.

ABSTRACT We document multiple dimensions of usefulness of banks' interest income sensitivity disclosures. First, we find management-generated sensitivity measures are predictive of future realized changes in net interest income. Second, we find financial analysts' forecasts of net interest income reflect information provided by interest income sensitivity disclosures. Third, we find equity market responses to interest rate shocks as well as firms' interest rate betas are larger for banks with greater disclosed sensitivity of net interest income to interest rate changes. Across all of these tests, the informativeness of income sensitivity measures is incremental to that of regulatory data. These results suggest that interest income sensitivity disclosures are informative measures of interest rate risk. Our results contradict assertions that these disclosures are useless due to lack of relevance of income sensitivity, poor modeling techniques, and/or redundancy relative to regulatory data. JEL Classifications: G21; M41.

We find that equity returns associated with credit risk changes are attenuated by the debt value effect of the credit risk changes, as Merton (1974) predicts. We find that the relation between credit risk changes and equity returns is significantly less negative for firms with more debt—controlling for asset value changes, credit risk increases (decreases) are associated with equity value increases (decreases). This result obtains across credit risk levels. The relation is associated with changes in both expected cash flows and systematic risk, as reflected in analyst earnings forecasts and equity cost of capital. By inverting the Merton (1974) model, we provide descriptive evidence that if unrecognized debt value changes were recognized in income, but not unrecognized asset value changes, most credit upgrade (downgrade) firms would recognize lower (higher) income. These potentially counterintuitive income effects primarily are attributable to incomplete recognition of contemporaneous asset value changes. However, for a substantial majority of downgrade firms we find that recognized asset write-downs exceed unrecognized gains from debt value decreases. This mitigates concerns that income effects from recognizing changes in debt values would be anomalous for such firms.

We analyze a sample of 330 firms making unaudited disclosures required by Section 302 and 383 firms making audited disclosures required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that Section 302 disclosures are associated with negative announcement abnormal returns of −1.8 percent, and that firms experience an abnormal increase in equity cost of capital of 68 basis points. We conclude that Section 302 disclosures are informative and point to lower credibility of disclosing firms' financial reporting. In contrast, we find that Section 404 disclosures have no noticeable impact on stock prices or firms' cost of capital. Further, we find that auditor quality attenuates the negative response to Section 302 disclosures and that accelerated filers—larger firms required to file under Section 404—have significantly less negative returns (−1.10 percent) than non-accelerated filers (−4.22 percent). The findings have implications for the debate about whether to implement a scaled securities regulation system for smaller public companies: material weakness disclosures are more informative for smaller firms that likely have higher pre-disclosure information uncertainty.

We investigate the risk relevance of the standard deviation of three performance measures: net income, comprehensive income, and a constructed measure of full-fair-value income for a sample of 202 U.S. commercial banks from 1996 to 2004. We find that, for the average sample bank, the volatility of full-fair-value income is more than three times that of comprehensive income and more than five times that of net income. We find that the incremental volatility in full-fair-value income (beyond the volatility of net income and comprehensive income) is positively related to marketmodel beta, the standard deviation in stock returns, and long-term interest-rate beta. Further, we predict and find that the incremental volatility in full-fair-value income (1) negatively moderates the relation between abnormal earnings and banks' share prices and (2) positively affects the expected return implicit in bank share prices. Our findings suggest full-fair-value income volatility reflects elements of risk that are not captured by volatility in net income or comprehensive income, and relates more closely to capital-market pricing of that risk than either net-income volatility or comprehensiveincome volatility.