[Sweden offers a unique natural experiment to analyze the effects of institutionalized saving on the ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm performance. The Swedish pension reform increased the stock market participation of pension funds, causing a significant reshuffling in the ownership of pension funds. We show that the effects of institutional investment on firm performance depend on the industry structure of pension funds. Firm valuation improves if public pension funds and large independent private pension funds increase their shareholdings. Additionally, controlling shareholders appear reluctant to relinquish control and the control premium increases if public pension funds acquire shares.]

[The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100% small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.]

[We employ a novel data set on almost 30,000 trade credit contracts to describe the broad characteristics of the parties that contract together and the key terms of these contracts. Whereas prior work has typically used information on only one side of the buyer-seller transaction, we utilize information on both, allowing for the first analysis of buyer-seller pairs. An equally important distinction is that we have multiple contracts for the same buyer or supplier firms, rather than a firm-average response, allowing for the correction of time-invariant firm characteristics that might determine the choice of credit terms. We find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities from smaller suppliers, and that discounts for early payment tend to be offered to riskier buyers.]

Only recently the debate on bank capital regulation has devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions can play as a part of the overall capital regulatory framework. This paper contributes to the ongoing debate by demonstrating empirically that loan loss provisioning needs to be an integral component of capital regulation. We find empirical evidence that many banks around the world delay provisioning for bad loans until too late, when cyclical downturns have already set in, thereby magnifying the impact of the economic cycle on banks' income and capital.

[This paper assesses the impact of the geographic diversification of bank holding company (BHC) assets across the United States on their market valuations. Using two new identification strategies based on the dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation, we find that exogenous increases in geographic diversity reduced BHC valuations. We also find that the geographic diversification of BHC assets increased insider lending and reduced loan quality. Taken together, these findings are consistent with theories predicting that geographic diversity intensifies agency problems.]

We investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks’ lending spreads for a large cross-section of countries. We measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at the country level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks. We find that judicial efficiency and inflation rates are the main drivers of interest rate spreads across countries. Our results suggest that improvements in judicial efficiency and judicial enforcement of debt contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms.

We exploit regional variations in U.S. house price fluctuations during the boom-bust cycle of the 2000s to study the impact of the housing cycle on young Americans' choices related to education and employment. We find that in MSAs which experienced large increases in house prices between 2001 and 2006, young adults were substantially more likely to forego a higher education and join the workforce, lowering skill formation. During the bust years, the young, especially those without higher education, were more likely to be unemployed in areas which experienced higher declines in house prices.

This paper studies how US monetary policy affects global stock prices. We find that global stock prices respond strongly to changes in US interest rates, with stock prices increasing (decreasing) following unexpected monetary loosening (tightening). This impact is more pronounced for sectors that depend on external financing, and for countries whose domestic monetary policy is more aligned with that of the United States. Using investment data, we present results consistent with this effect operating primarily through changes in risk premiums as opposed to changes in expected returns. These findings suggest that US monetary shocks affect firms’ stock prices by influencing local interest rates, and offer new evidence that financial frictions play an important role in the transmission of monetary policy to the real economy.

We evaluate the impact of corporate governance on the valuation of firms in a large cross-section of countries. Unlike previous work, we differentiate between minimally accepted governance attributes that are satisfied by all firms in a given country and governance attributes that are adopted at the firm level. This approach allows us to differentiate between firm-level and country-level corporate governance, thus contributing to an ongoing debate in the literature about whether governance attributes are largely determined by country factors or firm characteristics. Despite the costs associated with improving corporate governance at the firm level, we find that many firms choose to adopt governance provisions beyond those that are adopted by all firms in the country, and that these improvements in corporate governance are positively associated with firm valuation. Firms that choose not to adopt sound governance mechanisms tend to have concentrated ownership and sizeable free cash flow, consistent with agency theories based on self-interested managers and controlling shareholders. Our results indicate that the market rewards companies that are prepared to adopt governance attributes beyond those required by laws and common corporate practices in the home country.

We exploit the domestic portfolios of US mutual funds to provide microeconomic evidence that investors are more likely to liquidate geographically remote investments at times of high aggregate market volatility. This has important implications for asset prices. The valuations of stocks with ex ante less local ownership decline more when aggregate market volatility is high. Furthermore, the returns of stocks with geographically distant owners are more exposed to changes in aggregate market volatility.