The problem of the existence of a competitive equilibrium in models with hidden knowledge and self-knowledge has been discussed previously by M. Rothschild and J. E. Stiglitz_(1976), C. A. Wilson_(1977), and J. G. Riley_(1979). Recent analyses of such models by I. Cho and D. Kreps_(1986) and Riley argue for a particular outcome - the Pareto-dominant separating, zero-profit one. The authors prove the existence of such an outcome under very general conditions and, generalizing the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by Riley, they prove this outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium. Copyright 1987 by The Econometric Society.

We provide compelling evidence of the association between credit standards at loan origination in the corporate sector and default risk. While this relationship has been extensively studied in the mortgage market, it remains underexplored in corporate lending. Using a comprehensive dataset from the Spanish credit register merged with firm-level balance sheet information over a full financial cycle, we show that debt-to-assets and interest coverage ratios at loan origination are significant predictors of future corporate loan defaults. The strength of this association varies across the financial cycle, sectors, firm size and age, and prior banking relationships. Real estate firms and small and medium-sized enterprises exhibit the strongest link between initial credit conditions and future default outcomes. Our findings suggest that limits in corporate credit standards, similar to those widely used in mortgage markets, could enhance firms’ resilience to adverse shocks and complement capital-based instruments within the macroprudential toolkit. However, the effectiveness and potential side effects of such measures depend critically on firm-specific characteristics and sectoral heterogeneity, underscoring the need for a targeted and flexible policy design.