This paper uses firm-level panel data to investigate the proposition that reliquification is an important phase of the business cycle. It occurs late during recessions and is characterized by prolonged reductions in real investment, caused by firms needing to accumulate assets in order to improve their financial health. The paper concludes that a buildup of assets precedes an increase in investment. This effect is more important for firms without access to organized bond markets and during recession years.

Executive compensation, Firm performance, Interindustry differences, Stewardship objective

We test whether airline consolidations generate monopoly profits by examining returns to listed carriers around horizontal airline-acquisition bids and evaluating effects of industry concentration on share-price reactions. Under Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulation, returns to targets, bidders, and rival carriers are positive functions of changes in concentration implied by bids. Changes in concentration after deregulation have no positive effect on carrier returns. These results support Jordan's (1970, 1972) hypothesis that CAB activities fostered carrier collusion. There is no evidence of monopoly gains from carrier consolidations after deregulation.

This paper examines the pricing of S&P 100 calls using 14 months of transactions data. We find that market prices of S&P 100 calls differ systematically from Black-Scholes values. The biases in Black-Scholes model prices are both statistically and economically significant and correspond to biases that arise if market prices incorporate a stochastically changing volatility of the index.

“The definition of auditing calls for the communication of the degree of correspondence between assertions and established criteria” (AAA. 1972). At present, there continues to be no precise scale for measuring the degree of credibility lent to financial statements by the auditor. Don Leslie recently recommended adoption of a standard requiring auditors to disclose their operational materiality levels [Leslie, 1985]. No serious research has examined this proposal. The American Auditing Standards Board recently modified the standard form auditor's report in the United States. Neither Leslie's recommendation nor universal definitions of materiality were adopted. Among the objectives of report revision are better auditor‐user communication and abridgment of auditor legal liability. Few empirical studies have considered the former; none that we know of have examined the latter. This study enters that void and examines whether selected report modifications including explicit disclosure of the working materiality thresholds underlying preparation and audit of the financial statements serve to mitigate auditor liability. A behavioral experiment was conducted with 77 general jurisdiction judges serving as subjects. Findings support the potential for meaningful modifications to the standard auditor's report to abridge auditor liability. Résumé. « La définition de la vérification fait intervenir la communication du degré de correspondance entre des assertions et des critères établis», [Traduction. AAA 1972]. À l'heure actuelle, il n'existe toujours pas d'échelle précise permettant de mesurer le degré de fiabilité que le vérificateur accorde aux états financiers. Don Leslie recommandait récemment l'adoption d'une norme exigeant que les vérificateurs fassent état des niveaux d'importance relative qu'ils utilisent [Leslie, 1985]. Cette proposition n'a fait l'objet d'aucune recherche sérieuse. L'American Auditing Standards Board modifiait récemment aux États‐Unis le rapport type du vérificateur. Ni la recommandation de Leslie, ni les définitions universelles de l'importance relative n'ont été adoptées. Parmi les objectifs de ce remaniement du rapport type du vérificateur figurent une meilleure communication entre le vérificateur et l'utilisateur et la limitation de la responsabilité civile du vérificateur. Peu d'études empiriques ont porté sur la première question et, à notre connaissance, aucune ne s'est intéressée à la seconde. Les auteurs, pour combler cette lacune, examinent si certaines modifications sélectionnées apportées au rapport type du vérificateur, parmi lesquelles la divulgation explicite des seuils de tolérance opérationnels sous‐jacents à la préparation et à la vérification des états financiers, font en sorte de limiter la responsabilité des vérificateurs. Une expérience de comportement a été menée auprès de 77 juges de compétence générale qui ont servi de sujets. Les résultats de l'étude confirment que des modifications pertinentes au rapport type du vérificateur peuvent limiter la responsabilité de ce dernier.

Previous structural models of job search behavior have been based upon the reservation wage property. This article provides estimates of a more general search model that nests models with the reservation wage property. The estimates lead to rejection of the reservation wage property. The model includes hours of work in the utility function, but other nonwage job characteristics can be included as well. An experiment based on the estimated parameters indicates that a significant proportion of job offers would be mistakenly predicted to be accepted or rejected under the restrictions implied by the reservation wage property.

Journal Article Consistent Wage Offer and Reservation Wage Distributions Get access Michael Sattinger Michael Sattinger State University of New York at Albany Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 106, Issue 1, February 1991, Pages 277–288, https://doi.org/10.2307/2937916 Published: 01 February 1991

I test for the importance of wage rigidities from long-term contracts by observing how employment responds when firms and workers recontract. If rigidities are important, then employment should adjust after recontracting to partially undo its movements during the past contract. I examine twelve manufacturing industries that display a strong bargaining pattern. I find employment does rebound after recontracting, particularly in motor vehicles. This implies that contract rigidities are important. I also find responses in wage growth at the beginning of new contracts; but these responses are not related to the pattern of employment responses across industries.

This paper provides a model in which audited reports are valuable to entrepreneurs who have private information and seek to share risks with investors. A distinctive feature of the model is that the choice of auditor and the resulting audited report provide partial information about the entrepreneur's private information, and he resolves all remaining investor uncertainty by signalling with retained ownership. The value of an audit is increasing in audit quality and the firm-specific risk faced by the entrepreneur and is a nondecreasing function of the entrepreneur's expectations about the future value of the firm.