Contrary to the predictions of traditional life-cycle models, household consumption is excessively sensitive to current income. Similarly, weak evidence of income hedging runs against standard portfolio theory. We link these two puzzles by modifying the theoretical framework of Viceira (2001) to study how consumption-income sensitivities generated by income in the utility function affect households' portfolio choices. Empirically, we find that consumption-income sensitivities affect asset allocation through the income hedging channel. In particular, we show that the interaction between consumption-income sensitivity and the correlation of income growth to stock market returns is an important explanatory variable for households' stock market holdings. Received October 20, 2016; editorial decision April 25, 2018 by Editor Wayne Ferson.

From 2007 to 2016, S&P 500 firms distributed $7 trillion via buybacks and dividends, over 96% of their aggregate net income, prompting claims that “short-termism” is impairing firms’ ability to invest and innovate. We show that, accounting for both direct and indirect equity issuances, net shareholder payouts by all public firms during this period totaled only 41% of net income. And, during this decade, investment substantially increased while cash balances ballooned. In short, S&P 500 shareholder-payout figures cannot provide much basis for the notion that short-termism has been depriving public firms of needed capital. Received September 23, 2018; Editorial decision November 13, 2018; Editor Andrew Ellul

This paper studies rehypothecation, a practice in which financial institutions re-pledge collateral pledged to them by their clients. Rehypothecation enhances provision of funding liquidity to the economy, but it also incurs deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when counterparties fail. We examine the possibility of a conflict between the intermediary and its borrower on rehypothecation arrangements. The direction of this conflict depends on haircuts of the contract between them: if the contract involves over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation. This offers an empirical prediction of a link between the size of haircut in collateralized financial contracts, borrower information, and the likelihood of rehypothecation.

We formulate and test hypotheses about how lead banks of syndicated loans use private information about loan quality, the Signaling and Sophisticated Syndicate Hypotheses. We measure private information using Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings made comparable using concordance tables. As outcomes, we use proportions of loans retained by lead banks from SNC and rate spreads on the loans from DealScan. We find favorable private information is associated with higher retention and lower spreads for pure term loans, supporting the Signaling Hypothesis. Only lower spreads occur for pure revolvers, likely because their syndicates more often include large sophisticated banks.

Suppliers are subject to the credit risk of their customers when they sell products on credit. However, rights to the collateral value of the products they sell may mitigate some of this risk. This paper demonstrates the important role of laws that support suppliers’ rights to reclaim and liquidate collateral. Using a change in the US bankruptcy code that altered the rights of a subset of suppliers, I use a difference-in-differences setting to show that an improvement in suppliers’ rights to the liquidation value of collateral results in an increase in the amount and duration of trade credit offered. The increase in collateral protection also reduced suppliers’ lending standards, resulting in more dispersed trade credit lending and riskier customer portfolios. Finally, I find that the increase in collateral rights decreased suppliers’ incentives to monitor their customers, consistent with collateral and monitoring being substitutes. Overall, the paper shows that with strong legal protections in place, trade credit has an important collateral component.

I exploit information in the cross-section of bid-ask spreads to develop a new measure of extreme event risk. Spreads embed tail risk information because liquidity providers require compensation for the possibility of sharp changes in asset values. I show that simple regressions relating spreads and trading volume to factor betas recover this information and deliver high-frequency tail risk estimates for common factors in stock returns. My methodology disentangles financial and aggregate market risks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis; quantifies jump risks associated with Federal Open Market Committee announcements; and anticipates an extreme liquidity shock before the 2010 Flash Crash. Received April 27, 2016; editorial decision August 10, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online

Against the backdrop of the role of derivatives in the recent financial crisis, this paper investigates the effect of derivatives usage on the risk and exposure of nonfinancial firms around the world, and presents evidence that they use derivatives for hedging purposes. There is no evidence of corporate speculation with derivatives for firms in individual countries or for different types of derivatives, except for marginally higher net commodity price exposure of firms using commodity price derivatives. Firms use derivatives for hedging purposes independent of access to derivatives or country-level corporate governance. While there are no differences in risk between firms in countries with strong and weak shareholder rights, the reduction in risk is larger for firms in countries where creditor rights are weak or where derivatives are readily available. Consequently, policy makers could facilitate corporate hedging activities by pursuing strategies that encourage the development of local-currency derivatives markets. Given the similarity in the use and effect of derivatives across countries, internationally harmonized regulation of derivatives markets may be adequate.

ABSTRACT We investigate the role that regulatory strictness plays on the enforcement of financial reporting transparency in the U.S. banking industry. Using a novel measure of regulatory strictness in the enforcement of capital adequacy, we show that strict regulators are more likely to enforce restatements of banks' call reports. Further, we find that the effect of regulatory strictness on accounting enforcement is strongest in periods leading up to economic downturns and for banks with riskier asset portfolios. Overall, the results from our study indicate that regulatory oversight plays an important role in enforcing financial reporting transparency, particularly in periods leading up to economic crises. We interpret this evidence as inconsistent with the idea that strict bank regulators put significant weight on concerns about the potential destabilizing effects of accounting transparency.

We present evidence that, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms responded to the increased requirement for outside director monitoring by substituting insiders with outside directors who have social or professional connections to their CEOs. This substitution was most significant in firms that have higher outside director monitoring costs – small, young firms, firms outside the S&P 1500 index, and firms with low analyst scrutiny. The addition of these “friendly” directors did not reduce firm performance, suggesting that it may have been an efficient response by firms aimed at lowering the additional monitoring costs imposed by the new regulations. Our findings suggest that, as with many other aspects of board composition, the determinants and consequences of appointing friendly directors vary with the costs and benefits of outside director monitoring.