[I present a methodology that uses the mixed jump-diffusion model for stock returns to estimate the separate effects of information surprises and strategic trading around corporate events. Using simulation techniques, I show that for events with multiple announcements spread over a long time, the estimators derived from the mixed jump-diffusion model are more powerful compared to the traditional cumulative abnormal return estimators. The new methodology is used to study the separate effects of information surprises and strategic trading associated with blockholdings and subsequent targeted repurchases. I find that for more than 93 percent of the firms in our sample the mixed jump-diffusion model is statistically superior to the pure diffusion model in describing stock returns. More important, I find a statistically significant negative effect due to trading, while the average effect around announcements is statistically insignificant. In contrast, the standard cumulative abnormal return is not statistically different from zero.]

An important group of traders in the foreign exchange market is governments who often adhere to a foreign exchange rate policy of occasional interventions with otherwise floating rates. In this article we provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence that government foreign exchange interventions create significant adverse selection problems for dealers. In particular, our model shows that the adverse selection component of the foreign exchange spread is positively related to the variance of unexpected intervention and that expected intervention has no impact on the spread. After controlling for inventory and order processing costs, we find that bid-ask spreads increase with U.S. dollar and German deutsche mark foreign exchange rate intervention during the period 1976-1994. Furthermore, when the intervention is decomposed into expected and unexpected components, we find a statistically and economically significant increase in spreads with the variance of unexpected intervention, while expected intervention has no significant impact on spreads.

I present a methodology that uses the mixed jump diffusion model for stock returns to estimate the separate effects of information surprises and strategic trading around corporate events. Using simulation techniques, I show that for events with multiple announcements spread over a long time, the estimators derived from the mixed jump-diffusion model are more powerful compared to the traditional cumulative abnormal return estimators. The new methodology is used to study the separate effects of information surprises and strategic trading associated with block holdings and subsequent targeted repurchases. I find that for more than 93 percent of the firms in our sample the mixed jump-diffusion model is statistically superior to the pure diffusion model in describing stock returns. More important, I find a statistically significant negative effect due to trading while the average effect around announcements is statistically insignificant. In contrast, the standard cumulative abnormal return is not statistically different from zero.

[We show that time variation in expected returns and/or partial price adjustments lead to a downward bias in previous estimators of both the spread and its components. We introduce a new approach that provides unbiased and efficient estimators of the components of the spread. We find that between 77 and 97 percent of the downward bias in previous spread estimates is caused by time variation in expected returns. More importantly, the adverse-selection component, though significant, accounts for a much smaller proportion (8 to 13 percent) of the quoted spread, at least for small trades, than the proportion (over 40 percent) previously reported in the literature. Order processing costs are the predominant component of quoted spreads.]

Using an improved measure of a common stock's annualized dividend yield, we document that risk-adjusted NYSE stock returns increase in dividend yield during the period from 1963 to 1994. This relation between return and yield is robust to various specifications of multifactor asset pricing models that incorporate the Fama–French factors. The magnitude of the yield effect is too large to be explained by a “tax penalty” on dividend income and is not explained by previously documented anomalies. Interestingly, the effect is primarily driven by smaller market capitalization stocks and zero-yield stocks.

An important group of traders in the foreign exchange market is governments who often adhere to a foreign exchange rate policy of occasional interventions with otherwise floating rates. In this article we provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence that government foreign exchange interventions create significant adverse selection problems for dealers. In particular, our model shows that the adverse selection component of the foreign exchange spread is positively related to the variance of unexpected intervention and that expected intervention has no impact on the spread. After controlling for inventory and order processing costs, we find that bid-ask spreads increase with U.S. dollar and German deutsche mark foreign exchange rate intervention during the period 1976–1994. Furthermore, when the intervention is decomposed into expected and unexpected components, we find a statistically and economically significant increase in spreads with the variance of unexpected intervention, while expected intervention has no significant impact on spreads.

Prior work with competitive rational expectations equilibrium models indicates that there should be a positive relation between trading volume and differences in beliefs or information among traders. We show that this result is sensitive to whether and how transaction costs are modeled. In a specialist market with endogenous transaction costs we show that trading volume can be negatively related to the degree of informational asymmetry in the market. Our analysis highlights the dependence of volume on market structure, and our results suggest that the 'volume effects' of corporate or macroeconomic events reflect a decrease, rather than an increase, in heterogeneity of beliefs or asymmetry of information.

We show that bid-ask errors in transaction prices are the predominant source of apparent price reversals in the short run for NASDAQ firms. Once we extract measurement errors in prices caused by the bid-ask spread, we find little evidence of market overreaction. On the contrary, we find that security returns are positively, and not negatively, autocorrelated. We also show that bid-ask errors lead to substantial spurious volatility in transaction returns; about half of measured daily return variances can be induced by the bid-ask effect.

This paper examines the degree of anonymity—the extent to which a trader is recognized as informed—on alternative market structures. We find evidence that is consistent with less anonymity on the NYSE specialist system compared to the NASDAQ dealer system. Specifically, when corporate insiders trade medium-sized quantities (500–9, 999 shares inclusive), NYSE listed stocks exhibit larger changes in proportional effective spreads than NASDAQ stocks. Taken together, these findings are consistent with Barclay and Warners (1993) contention that stealth (medium-sized) trades are more likely based on private information and insider trades are more transparent on the NYSE specialist system relative to the NASDAQ dealer system. The results support the hypothesis by Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) that the unique relationship between specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE leads to less anonymity.

This paper documents some empirical facts about ex‐day abnormal returns to high dividend yield stocks that are potentially subject to corporate dividend capture. We find that average abnormal ex‐dividend day returns are uniformly negative in each year after the introduction of negotiated commission rates and that time variation in ex‐day returns during the negotiated commission rates era is consistent with corporate tax‐based dividend capture. Ex‐day returns are more negative when the tax advantage to corporate dividend capture is greatest and more positive when increases in transaction costs and risk reduce incentives to engage in corporate tax‐based dividend capture.