Abstract Reviews the book "Imperial Sportswear, Inc.: An Audit Case Problem," by Stephen Fogg.

This study examines the impact of alternative risk assessment (standard risk checklist versus no checklist) and program development (standard program versus no program) tools on two facets of fraud planning effectiveness: (1) the quality of audit procedures relative to a benchmark validated by a panel of experts, and (2) the propensity to consult fraud experts. A between‐subjects experiment, using an SEC enforcement fraud case, was conducted to examine these relationships. Sixty‐nine auditors made risk assessments and designed an audit program. We found that auditors who used a standard risk checklist, structured by SAS No. 82 risk categories, made lower risk assessments than those without a checklist. This suggests that the use of the checklist was associated with a less effective diagnosis of the fraud. We also found that auditors with a standard audit program designed a relatively less effective fraud program than those without this tool but were not more willing to seek consultation with fraud experts. This suggests that standard programs may impair auditors' ability to respond to fraud risk. Finally, our results show that fraud risk assessment (FRASK) was not associated with the planning of more effective fraud procedures but was directly associated with the desire to consult with fraud specialists. This suggests that one benefit of improved FRASK is its relation with consultation. Overall, the findings call into question the effectiveness of standard audit tools in a fraud setting and highlight the need for a more strategic reasoning approach in an elevated risk situation.

Abstract This study examines the linkage among the initial hypothesis set, the information search, and decision performance in performing analytical procedures. We manipulated the quality of the initial hypothesis set and the quality of the information search to investigate the extent to which deficiencies (or benefits) in either process can be remedied (or negated) by the other phase. The hypothesis set manipulation entailed inheriting a correct hypothesis set, inheriting an incorrect hypothesis set, or generating a hypothesis set. The information search was manipulated by providing a balanced evidence set to auditors (i.e., evidence on a range of likely causes including the actual cause ‐ analogous to a standard audit program) or asking them to conduct their own search. One hundred and two auditors participated in the study. The results show that auditors who inherit a correct hypothesis set and receive balanced evidence performed better than those who inherit a correct hypothesis set and did their own search, as well as those who inherited an incorrect hypothesis set and were provided a balanced evidence set. The former performance difference arose because auditors who conducted their own search were found to do repeated testing of non‐errors and truncated their search. This suggests that having a correct hypothesis set does not ensure that a balanced testing strategy is employed, which, in turn, diminishes part of the presumed benefits of a correct hypothesis set. The latter performance difference was attributable to auditors' failure to generate new hypotheses when they received evidence about a hypothesis that was not in the current hypothesis set. This demonstrates that balanced evidence does not fully compensate for having an initial incorrect hypothesis set. These findings suggest the need for firm training and/or decision aids to facilitate both a balanced information search and an iterative hypothesis generation process.

There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi‐structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented.

This study investigates the joint effects of accountability and time budgets on auditors' testing strategies. The task studied, substantive analytical procedures, requires auditors to identify and test hypotheses when investigating the cause of unexpected fluctuations. Thus, auditors must determine the number of tests to conduct (i.e., extent), the number of potential hypotheses to directly test (i.e., breadth), the number of tests for each hypothesis (i.e., depth) and the number of potential error or non‐error hypotheses to test (i.e., focus). Testing strategies, which we define as choices made with respect to extent, focus, depth, and breadth of testing, have significant practical and theoretical implications. For example, reducing the breadth of testing may result in failure to test the correct hypothesis, potentially impairing audit effectiveness. In this study, auditors inherited five potential causes of an unexpected increase in the gross margin of a client. As in practice, their task was to conduct tests to investigate and identify the actual cause of the fluctuation. Auditors were randomly assigned to one of four conditions created by fully crossing accountability and time budgets. The results indicate that accountability leads to an increase in the extent and breadth of testing but does not affect the depth of testing. Further, accountability leads to an increase in the testing of errors but results in a decrease in the testing of non‐errors. The focus on breadth and error testing is consistent with the notion that accountability, to a superior with unspecified preferences, promotes more cautious behavior. The results also show that a time budget decreases the extent and depth of testing but does not affect the breadth of testing. There was no evidence that the two factors interactively affected testing strategies or performance. Finally, increased breadth of testing was the mechanism that led to better performance as measured by the identification of the actual cause of the unexpected fluctuation.

Despite regulations mandating audit committee economic independence, the CEO may still influence audit committee members’ objectivity through social ties (e.g., belonging to the same country club) or professional ties (e.g., having served on boards together). Additionally, prior archival research finds that audit committee industry expertise enhances financial reporting quality. Nonetheless, information about ties and industry expertise are not currently publicly disclosed in regulatory filings. In an experiment with 342 reasonably informed investors, we find, as hypothesized, that ties (professional or social) and industry expertise affect assessments of audit committee independence and competence. Using planned contrast tests, we also find that investors assess audit committees with no ties and industry expertise (social ties and no industry expertise) as the most (least) effective and also result in the highest (lowest) likelihood of investing. Further, the potential negative effects of social ties on investor’s judgments are muted when there is industry expertise present, while the presence of no ties appears to decrease negative effects on investor judgments due to a lack of industry expertise. This study provides important baseline evidence supporting the relevance of audit committee ties and industry expertise information to investors and thus suggests the value of increased disclosures to investors of such information to enhance their ability to make more informed investment decisions.