individual may indeed lead him to reject his sincere strategy. In the present paper, the same class of voting procedures is analyzed, and a similar result is shown to hold in terms of a new concept, that of weak domination in the extended sense between the strategies of an individual. The basic idea of the extension is to account for situations where only partial information on other individuals' preferences is held by members of the society, and to show that this partial would be sufficient for a rational individual to choose nonsincere strategies under certain conditions. The main motivation of this note is thus to relax the rather restrictive assumption of perfect knowledge underlying most of the analysis in the literature on strategic voting, and to examine the problem of strategic voting with a weaker assumption.

The paper puts forward an approach to the analysis of the problem of strategic voting in democratic choice. It is argued that the notion of K-stability (or other similar concepts of equilibrium) is not adequate as an instrument for analyzing strategic voting. An alternative framework of analysis is suggested and using this framework, the possibility of sincere voting is examined in the context of a class of democratic systems.