In Belgian corporate groups, complex pyramidal structures and interlocking ownership lead to separation of ownership and control. This may generate incentives for the controlling shareholder to divert resources within the group through intragroup equity sales. This in turn could lead to significant private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. We test this hypothesis by investigating the stock price reaction to the announcement of equity sales in Belgian groups. Our results suggest that intragroup equity sales create value for minority shareholders. Equity sales between group members and non-group members do not seem to affect the value for minority shareholders in Belgian groups.

We investigate the evolution of entrepreneurial firms’ debt policies over a period of 15years after startup, considering leverage, debt specialization, debt maturity and debt granularity. Our analysis is based on a unique sample covering all non-financial Belgian firms founded between 1996 and 1998. We find that the debt policy of entrepreneurial firms is remarkably stable over time. The debt policy in the initial year of operation is a very important determinant of future debt policies, even after controlling for traditional contemporaneous determinants. The founder-CEO has an important impact on the stability of debt policies: the influence of initial debt policies on future debt policies is significantly reduced when the founder-CEO is replaced or when (s)he dies. Combined, our findings support imprinting theory.

This paper examines the value of government ownership in Europe during the global financial crisis. This crisis was an exogenous shock for European firms, which allows us to observe an out-of-equilibrium effect on the costs and benefits of government ownership. Using a comprehensive sample of 4737 listed firms in 28 European countries over the period 2005–2009, we find that firms with government ownership experienced a smaller reduction in firm value than firms without government ownership. This effect was driven by firms located in countries where the risk of expropriation by the government is lower, that is, countries with less corruption and better investor protection.

We investigate whether investor protection and taxation legislation affect dividend policy, using a unique sample of all Belgian firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange between 1838 and 2012. Investor protection was very weak in Belgium before World War I, but gradually improved over time. Dividend taxation was introduced only in 1920. While it is generally believed that investor protection and taxation affect dividend policy, we find that dividend policy has been remarkably stable over time, even after controlling for firm characteristics. Changes in investor protection and taxation legislation seem to have had little impact on dividend policy.

Entrepreneurial finance is a distinctive aspect of corporate finance, notably with respect to informational asymmetries and investor involvement in portfolio companies. Entrepreneurial finance research has explored four levels of analysis: the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial firm, the organization providing finance to the entrepreneurs, the organizations providing funds to these organizations, and the region or country in which the entrepreneurial firms or investors are established. We discuss recent developments in forms of entrepreneurial finance. We summarize the contributions of the papers published in this issue on entrepreneurial finance at different points in the life cycle, including work on trade credit, debt finance, micro-cap IPOs, venture capital, and angel finance. Also, we highlight avenues for future research focusing on funding gaps, accelerators, crowdfunding, secondary buyouts, boards, and exits.

ABSTRACT Using a large sample of multinational corporations (MNCs), we examine the location of earnings management within the firm. We posit and find that MNCs manage their consolidated earnings through an orchestrated reporting strategy across subsidiaries over which they exert significant influence. Specifically, we find that headquarters' influence on subsidiary earnings management increases with the degree of subsidiary integration and the extent of earnings management opportunities. Most importantly, we provide evidence that MNCs exploit regulatory arbitrage opportunities arising from cross-country differences in institutional quality. We document that, in response to exogenous improvements in the quality of their home-country institutions, MNCs rebalance their reporting strategies by clustering earnings management in subsidiaries from countries with more lenient regulations. Taken together, our findings yield important insights on the drivers of earnings management location within the firm and highlight the need for better cross-country coordination in regulatory design. JEL Classifications: F23; G15; G34; G38; M41; M48.