[We investigate the trading of institutions immediately before the release of analysts' initial buy recommendations. We document abnormally high institutional trading volume and buying beginning five days before recommendations are publicly released. Abnormal buying is related to initiation characteristics that would require knowledge of the content of the report-such as the identity of the analyst and brokerage firm, and whether the recommendation is a strong buy. We confirm that institutions buying before the recommendation release earn abnormal profits. Our results are consistent with institutional traders receiving tips regarding the contents of forthcoming analysts' reports.]

This article provides a brief overview of the importance of market microstructure research and identifies existing areas of research that focus on links between microstructure and corporate finance. Each of the special issue articles is then summarized with particular attention given to the research contribution of the article and to the links explored between microstructure and corporate finance.

[We show that the positive volatility-volume relation documented by numerous researchers actually reflects the positive relation between volatility and the number of transactions. Thus, it is the occurrence of transactions per se, and not their size, that generates volatility; trade size has no information beyond that contained in the frequency of transactions. Our results suggest that theoretical research needs to entertain scenarios in which (i) both the frequency and size of trades are endogenously determined, yet (ii) the size of trades has no information content beyond that contained in the number of transactions.]

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.

We explore whether the relation between stock splits and clientele is driven by binding tick sizes. We find little evidence that firms adjusted prices to maintain similarly binding tick sizes as the NYSE reduced tick sizes. Furthermore, though splits that increase the extent to which tick sizes are binding are associated with greater increases in spreads, these splits experience similar changes in measures related to clientele, including trade size, breadth of individual and institutional ownership, and analyst following. We find little evidence supporting theories, such as spread-induced sponsorship, that rely on binding tick sizes to link splits and clientele.

We study order flow and liquidity around NYSE trading halts. We find that market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly during trading halts, that a large proportion of the limit order book at the reopen is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and that the market‐clearing price at the reopen is a good predictor of future prices. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to “spread the quote” prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants.

In June 1997, the New York Stock Exchange lowered its minimum price increment on most stocks from eighths to sixteenths. We use a sample of institutional trades to directly measure the effect of this tick size reduction on execution costs. Though quoted and effective spreads decline, realized execution costs for these institutions increase after the change to sixteenths. Costs increase most for orders that aggressively demand liquidity, including large orders, orders placed by momentum traders, and orders not worked by the trading desk. These findings emphasize that spreads are not a sufficient statistic for market quality. Smaller tick sizes may actually reduce market liquidity.

Abstract Recent papers have debated whether the negative correlation between measures of firm asset growth and subsequent returns is of little importance since it applies only to small firms, is justified as compensation for risk, or is evidence of mispricing. We show that the asset growth effect is pervasive, and evidence to the contrary arises due to specification choices; that one measure of asset growth, the change in total assets, largely subsumes the explanatory power of other measures; that the ability of asset growth to explain either the cross section of returns or the time series of factor loadings is linked to firm idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL); that the return effect is concentrated around earnings announcements; and that analyst forecasts are systematically higher than realized earnings for faster growing firms. In general, there appears to be no asset growth effect in firms with low IVOL. Our findings are consistent with a mispricing-based explanation for the asset growth effect in which arbitrage costs allow the effect to persist.

We show that the positive volatility-volume relation documented by numerous researchers actually reflects the positive relation between volatility and the number of transactions. Thus, it is the occurrence of transactions per se, and not their size, that generates volatility; trade size has no information beyond that contained in the frequency of transactions. Our results suggest that theoretical research needs to entertain scenarios in which (1) both the frequency and size of trades are endogenously determined, yet (2) the size of trades has no information content beyond that contained in the number of transactions. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.