I study how firms adjust leverage, debt maturity, and cash to manage profitability shocks, and show that time variation in concentration of maturity dates arises endogenously. To avoid rollover risk, firms prefer long-term debt with dispersed maturity dates. However, severe negative shocks force firms to borrow above an optimal level. They issue short-term debt as a commitment to delever in the next period. This concentrates maturity dates in the next period. The calibrated version of the model matches empirical facts and makes novel predictions regarding dynamics of debt maturity dispersion.

Much financial activity is zero-sum. While providing transactional and diversification services to others, participants also prey upon each other. High-ability predators trade opportunistically with less-able prey. In our dynamic model these features amplify real shocks. The presence of more low-ability traders reduces expected losses to high-ability traders, leading to equilibria with high levels of financial activity and employment. Shocks to profits can motivate exit by low-ability traders, rendering those of intermediate skill more vulnerable. Thus, our relatively simple model generates boom-bust dynamics suggestive of Wall Street. (JEL G00, G20, E44)

We show that firms with longer debt maturities earn risk premia not explained by unconditional factors. Embedding dynamic capital structure choices in an asset-pricing framework where the market price of risk evolves with the business cycle, we find that firms with long-term debt exhibit more countercyclical leverage. The induced covariance between betas and the market price of risk generates a maturity premium similar in size to our empirical estimate of 0.21% per month. We also provide direct evidence for the model mechanism and confirm that the maturity premium is consistent with observed leverage dynamics of long- and short-maturity firms.