In this paper, I examine the relation between disclosure commitment and cost of equity capital using accelerated earnings announcement disclosures as a measure of commitment. In settings characterized by imperfect market competition, I find that firms which consistently disclose balance sheet detail in relatively timely earnings announcements have lower costs of capital compared to other firms. This result is statistically significant and economically meaningful, and is robust to various alternative measurements for cost of capital, and alternative designs addressing endogeneity and underlying information quality. Overall, this result is important because it highlights additional dimensions of disclosure commitment (consistency and timeliness), while incorporating important features from theoretical models (information quality and market competition). In particular, my results suggest that consistency and timeliness are salient features of firms' disclosure behavior that have predictable and robust relations with capital market outcomes. This result is robust to controlling for underlying information quality; however, consistent with theory, it is conditional on low levels of market competition.

In this paper, we propose and empirically test a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates two major improvements relative to extant models. First, in terms of model construction, we incorporate mean reversion through the use of a two‐stage partial adjustment model and inclusion of a number of additional relevant determinants of profitability. Second, in terms of model estimation, we employ least absolute deviation (LAD) analysis instead of ordinary least squares because the former approach is able to better accommodate outliers. Results reveal that forecasts from our model are more accurate than three extant models at every forecast horizon considered and more accurate than consensus analyst forecasts at forecast horizons of two through five years. Further analysis reveals that LAD estimation provides the greatest incremental accuracy improvement followed by the inclusion of income subcomponents as predictor variables, and implementation of the two‐stage partial adjustment model. In terms of economic relevance, we find that forecasts from our model are informative about future returns, incremental to forecasts from other models, analysts’ forecasts, and standard risk factors. Overall, our results are important because they document the increased accuracy and economic relevance of a cross‐sectional profitability forecasting model which incorporates improvements to extant models in terms of model construction and estimation.

We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes.

Based on data collected from 616 experienced financial officers who use U.S. GAAP or IFRS and are domiciled in the U.S., Europe, or Asia, we examine how reporting standards (U.S. GAAP versus IFRS) and domicile (U.S. versus non-U.S.) affect earnings management (real versus accrual). U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP rely more heavily on real methods than non-U.S. firms that use either IFRS or U.S. GAAP and U.S. firms using IFRS. U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP operate in an environment that encourages real over accruals methods; specifically, U.S. GAAP facilitates detection of earnings management, and enforcement is more effective in the U.S. Further, the likelihood and amount of earnings management do not differ across conditions, suggesting that firms using less accruals earnings management tend to fully compensate by increasing real methods. So stronger reporting environments do not necessarily reduce total earnings management, but instead encourage substitution of real for accruals methods.

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