To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
10 results

Foreign bank ownership and household credit

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2015 24(4), 466-486
Theoretical and empirical work on banking emphasizes the role of banks in overcoming information asymmetries and agency problems between borrowers and lenders. This paper investigates the importance of bank ownership in determining the sorts of customers that a bank serves, and consequently, the sorts of information problems a bank lender chooses to address. Using survey data for over 16,500 households from 19 emerging economies in Central and Eastern Europe in 2010 this paper is the first to document that information asymmetries in the retail credit market lead foreign banks to cherry-pick financially transparent clients in similar ways as documented previously for enterprise credit. First, a higher market share of foreign banks in a country is associated with a larger gap in credit use between households with and without formal employment. Second, among mortgage borrowers, clients of foreign banks are more likely to be formally employed, are more likely to have personal assets, and are richer than clients of domestic banks. Third, consistent with these results, retail lending techniques of foreign banks rely more on financial information and collateral than those of domestic banks.

Regional Inflation, Banking Integration, and Dollarization

Review of Finance 2018 22(6), 2073-2108
We exploit variation in consumer price inflation across seventy-one Russian regions to examine the relationship between the perceived stability of the domestic currency and financial dollarization. Our results show that regions with higher inflation experience an increase in the dollarization of household deposits and a decrease in the dollarization of loans. The impact of inflation on credit dollarization is weaker in regions with less integrated banking markets. This suggests that the currency-portfolio choices of households and firms are constrained by the asset-liability management of banks.

The emergence of information sharing in credit markets

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2010 19(2), 255-278
We provide the first systematic empirical analysis of how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones. Lenders may, however, also lose market power by sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric information in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between lenders significantly. Stronger competition between lenders reduces information sharing. In credit markets where lenders may fail to coordinate on sharing information, the degree of information asymmetry, rather than lender competition, drives actual information sharing behavior.

Foreign currency borrowing by small firms in the transition economies

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2011 20(3), 285-302
We examine the firm- and country-level determinants of foreign currency borrowing by small firms, using information on the most recent loan extended to 3101 firms in 25 transition countries between 2002 and 2005. Our results suggest that foreign currency borrowing is much stronger related to firm-level foreign currency revenues than it is to country-level interest rate differentials. Supporting the conclusion that carry-trade behavior is not the key driver of foreign currency borrowing in our sample we find no evidence that firm-level indicators of distress costs or financial transparency affect loan currency denomination. Overall, our findings suggest that retail clients which do take foreign currency loans are better equipped to bear the corresponding currency risks than is commonly thought. Policy makers should therefore take a closer look at the characteristics of borrowers before implementing regulations which are aimed at curbing foreign currency loans.

Information sharing and credit: Firm-level evidence from transition countries

Journal of Financial Intermediation 2009 18(2), 151-172 open access
We investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit to firms. This correlation is stronger for opaque firms than transparent ones and stronger in countries with weak legal environments than in those with strong legal environments. In cross-sectional estimates, we control for variation in country-level aggregate variables that may affect credit, by examining the differential impact of information sharing across firm types. In panel estimates, we also control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for changes in macroeconomic variables and the legal environment.

Microfinance Banks and Financial Inclusion

Review of Finance 2016 20(3), 907-946 open access
We examine how the geographical proximity to a microfinance bank affects financial inclusion. We study the expansion of the branch network of ProCredit banks in South-East Europe between 2006 and 2010. We report three main findings: First, ProCredit is more likely to open a new branch in areas with a large share of low-income households. Second, in locations where ProCredit opens a new branch the share of banked households increases more than in locations where it does not open a new branch. Third, this increase is particularly strong among low-income households, older households, and households which rely on transfer income.

Deposit withdrawals from distressed banks: Client relationships matter

Journal of Financial Stability 2020 46, 100707 open access
We study retail deposit withdrawals from commercial banks that were differentially exposed to distress during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. We show that the propensity of clients to withdraw deposits increases with the severity of bank distress. However, an exclusive pre-crisis bank-client relationship eliminates withdrawal risk. The mechanism through which strong bank-client relationships mitigate withdrawal risk relates to the transaction costs of switching accounts rather than informational rents or differentiated services. Our findings provide empirical support to the Basel III liquidity regulations that emphasize the role of well-established client relationships for the stability of bank funding.

The impact of banking sector reform in a transition economy: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan

Journal of Banking & Finance 2009 33(9), 1677-1687 open access
We examine the impact of financial sector reform on interest rate levels and spreads using Kyrgyz bank-level data from 1998 to 2005. We find that, in addition to macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms to the banking sector significantly contributed to lower interest rates. In particular, our results suggest that foreign bank entry and regulatory efforts to increase average bank size were important in reducing deposit rates. In contrast, we find little evidence that banking sector reform or macroeconomic stabilization has impacted interest rate spreads.

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

Econometrica 2004 72(3), 747-780
We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are initiated with private offers and the parties share the gains from trade equally. Low effort or bad quality is penalized by the termination of the relationship, wielding a powerful effect on contract enforcement. Successful long-term relations exhibit generous rent sharing and high effort (quality) from the very beginning of the relationship. In the absence of third-party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. If contracts are third party enforceable, rent sharing and long-term relations are absent and the vast majority of trades are initiated with public offers. Most trades take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the identity of their trading partner. Copyright The Econometric Society 2004.