This paper presents a new view on the gold price of greenbacks during and after the American Civil War by analyzing exchange-rate volatility rather than exchange-rate levels. Our empirical investigation detects regimes of high and low volatility alternating in a way that is consistent with a theoretical exchange-rate model in which the rate is primarily driven by investors’ expectations and not by fundamentals. We interpret these findings as evidence that monetary policy makers were surprisingly able to credibly announce the resumption to gold half a year before it actually took place on January 1, 1879. Given the intense political debate about the appropriate design of the United States’ financial system, this is a remarkable result. It indicates that the policy makers’ ability to anchor investors’ expectations is relevant to achieving asset-price stability as well as effectiveness of financial market regulation. The insights from this historical episode should therefore be of interest to policy makers and regulators combating financial crises like the ongoing current debt crises worldwide.

We estimate a Stock/Watson index of economic activity to assess U.S. business cycle volatility since 1867. We replicate the Great Moderation of the 1980s and 1990s and find exceptionally low volatility also in the Golden Age of the 1960s. Postwar moderation relative to pre-1914 occurs under constant but not time-varying factor loadings, suggesting structural change toward more volatile sectors. For comparable series, the U.S. postwar business cycle was as volatile overall as under the Classical Gold Standard, but much less so during the Great Moderation and the Golden Age.