Abstract This article examines the labor market implications of the EU posting policy, a large temporary migration program facilitated by the liberalization of the free provision of services in Europe. Posting allows EU firms to send (post) their employees abroad to export customer-facing services. Combining administrative data and quasi-experimental policy variation, I find that the policy permanently increased total factor mobility in Europe without crowding out traditional migration. This result suggests that unrealized gains from trade in factor services remained despite the absence of regulatory barriers to trade and migration in the EU. Furthermore, posted workers are mostly sent from low-wage countries to perform manual tasks in sectors formerly insulated from trade, and they represent a substantial share of EU migrant workers. In receiving countries, posting had persistent negative effects on employment for domestic workers in the more exposed sectors and local labor markets, but it had no effects on domestic wages. In low-wage sending countries, firms in formerly “nontradable” sectors experienced increased sales, profits, and tax payments when exporting services through posting. Posted workers earn more once sent abroad but remain paid at lower wages than comparable domestic workers in the receiving country. Wage gains for posted workers are mostly explained by minimum wages enforced by the EU policy, highlighting the role of labor market regulations in shaping the way gains from globalization are shared between labor and capital owners in origin countries.

This paper demonstrates that labor market regulations, such as minimum wages or payroll taxes, shape trade competition in labor-intensive activities. I exploit data from a large European trade program where firms from different countries supply labor services at the same location but face different payroll taxes and minimum wage rules. Country case studies and model-consistent gravity estimates show large trade responses to tax and regulatory reforms, with an elasticity of trade in services to labor costs larger than one. The results imply that absent regulatory and fiscal harmonization, export competitiveness depends, in part, on domestic labor market policies. (JEL F14, F16, F42, H25, J22, J23, K31)