We provide causal evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) improve the performance of their portfolio companies by replacing founders. Using a database of venture capital financings augmented with hand-collected founder turnover events, we exploit shocks to the supply of outside executives via 14 states’changes to non-compete laws from 1995 to 2016. Naive regressions of startup performance on replacement suggest a negative correlation that may reflect negative selection. Indeed, instrumented regressions reverse the sign of this effect, suggesting that founder replacement instead improves performance. The evidence points to the replacement of founders as a specific mechanism by which VCs add value.

We provide causal evidence that venture capitalists (VCs) improve the performance of their portfolio companies by replacing founders. Using a database of venture capital financings augmented with hand-collected founder turnover events, we exploit shocks to the supply of outside executives via 14 states’ changes to non-compete laws from 1995 to 2016. Naive regressions of startup performance on replacement suggest a negative correlation that may reflect negative selection. Indeed, instrumented regressions reverse the sign of this effect, suggesting that founder replacement instead improves performance. The evidence points to the replacement of founders as a specific mechanism by which VCs add value.

ABSTRACT We classify the race of over 160,000 U.S. founders and investors and study the venture capital (VC) funding gap for Black entrepreneurs. Only 3.1% of VC‐funded startups are Black‐owned, and they raise half as much VC funding as others. We attribute much of this gap to Black founders having fewer traditional success markers, like patents or entrepreneurial experience. This disparity also affects matching: Black VC partners invest more in Black founders, and these investments have higher successful exit rates. We attribute this outperformance to lower information asymmetries due to network overlap and “screening discrimination,” whereby Black VCs better differentiate among Black founders.

We provide evidence that an influx of technical human capital improves regional entrepreneurship, both by increasing firm entry and reducing entrepreneurial failure. The results also indicate negative externalities upon lowtech and competing industries: an influx of inventors in a county shifts the locus of venture capital investment away from low-tech startups to high-tech startups and moreover towards new ventures in the same sector as those inventors' skills. We strengthen causal inference with a shift-share instrument which combines the spatial distribution of surnames in the LM>= U.S. Census with thousands of surnamespecific shifts based on modern inventor mobility.