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We study the emergence of a new channel for firms’ political activity using dark money through undisclosed and unlimited contributions. After the U.S. federal court decisions in 2010, S&P 500 firms substantially increased their use of dark money. We find that dark money contributions complement political engagement through campaign contributions and lobbying. Firms disclose dark money contributions when they face heightened nondisclosure costs. Firms contributing to dark money groups benefit by receiving more procurement contracts and increased government subsidies. Our findings highlight that political connections by firms are evolving and expanding through new and largely unexplored channels.

Platform intermediation of goods and services has considerably transformed the U.S. economy. We use administrative data on U.S. tax returns to study the role of the gig economy on entrepreneurship. We find that gig workers are more likely to become entrepreneurs, particularly those who are lower income, younger, and benefit from flexibility. We track all newly created firms and show that gig workers start firms in similar industries as their gig experience, which are less likely to survive and demonstrate higher performance. Overall, our findings suggest on-the-job learning promotes entrepreneurial entry and shifts the types of firms started by entrepreneurs.

We summarize and synthesize the results from 73 studies that examine the consequences of shareholder activism for targeted firms, and draw two primary conclusions. First, activism that adopts some characteristics of corporate takeovers, especially significant stockholdings, is associated with improvements in share values and firm operations. Activism that is not associated with the formation of ownership blocks is associated with insignificant or very small changes in target firm value. Second, shareholder activism has become more value increasing over time. Research based on shareholder activism from the 1980s and 1990s generally finds few consequential effects, while activism in more recent years is more frequently associated with increased share values and operating performance. These results are consistent with Alchian and Demsetz' (1972) argument that managerial agency problems are controlled in part by dynamic changes in ownership, and with Alchian's (1950) observation that business practices adapt over time to mimic successful strategies.

This paper provides novel evidence that corporate political influence operates through renegotiations of existing government contracts. Using detailed data on contractual terms and renegotiations around sudden deaths and resignations of local politicians, the estimates show that politically connected firms initially bid low and successfully renegotiate contract amounts, deadlines, and incentives. The effects hold across different industries and contract types, enhance firm value, and persist around the exogenous increase in contract supply due to the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Overall, this paper establishes an unexplored link between political influence, ex post renegotiations, and ex ante bidding of government contracts.

Angel investor tax credits are used globally to spur high‐growth entrepreneurship. Exploiting their staggered implementation in 31 U.S. states, we find that they increase angel investment yet have no significant impact on entrepreneurial activity. Two mechanisms explain these results: crowding out of alternative financing and low sensitivity of professional investors to tax credits. With a large‐scale survey and a stylized model, we show that low responsiveness among professional angels may reflect the fat‐tailed return distributions that characterize high‐growth startups. The results contrast with evidence that direct subsidies to firms have positive effects, raising concerns about promoting entrepreneurship with investor subsidies.