This paper uses alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry to test contractual theories of the firm. I find that the allocation of control rights between pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms is sensitive to the bargaining position of both parties. Pharmaceutical firms engaging in more costly, later stage alliances tend, on average, to relinquish more rights. Additionally, biotechnology firms entering their first alliance tend, on average, to relinquish more rights. Finally, I explore if and when alliances begin to impact pharmaceutical firm shareholder value. Overall, my findings indicate the importance of considering both parties to a contract when studying contractual design.

We examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. A unique Desperation Index is employed to determine the current status of a firm's internal productivity. We find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines.

We use U.S. county data (3,058 observations) and 41 conditioning variables to study growth and convergence. Using ordinary least squares (OLS) and three-stage least squares with instrumental variables (3SLS-IV), we report on the full sample and metro, nonmetro, and and regional samples: (1) OLS yields convergence rates around 2%; 3SLS yields 6%–8%; (2) convergence rates vary (for example, the Southern rate is 2.5 times the Northeastern rate); (3) federal, state, and local government negatively correlates with growth; (4) the relationship between educational attainment and growth is nonlinear; and (5) the finance, insurance, and real estate industry and the entertainment industry correlate positively with growth, whereas education employment correlates negatively.

Research has focused on why and when firms access external technology markets. Less is known about the reliability of patents attached to licensed technologies during litigation. Unreliable patents expose a firm to loss of downstream revenues. We address this by constructing a data set of patent litigation in the pharmaceutical industry and exploit a change in patent law that exogenously increased the probability of litigation. We find that licensed patents are more likely to fall during litigation. This effect is isolated to firms with fewer intellectual property capabilities and less patenting experience, suggesting that benefits from external technology are not shared equally.