This paper shows that industry specialization of loan officers facilitates monitoring synergies and lowers credit default rates of small- and medium-sized enterprises. We exploit a wave of early loan officer retirements as a quasi-natural experiment, in which the resulting borrower reallocations changed the industry specialization levels of the remaining loan officers. In a difference-in-differences analysis excluding all reallocated borrowers, we find that a negative shock to loan officer specialization increases default rates due to an inferior production of default risk information and excessive loan growth. A positive shock to loan officer specialization generates opposite effects. Our results suggest that loan officers can exploit industry specialization and related monitoring synergies to improve lending decisions and thereby contribute to lowering credit default rates in the bank's borrower portfolio.

We examine the developments of depositor knowledge, attitudes, and behavior throughout the recent financial crisis and discuss their impact on bank run risk. Based on a self-collected data set surveying depositors before (2007), at (2008), and after the peak of the crisis (2009), we observe a worrying dynamic pattern. At the peak, depositors knew more about deposit insurance, placed more importance on deposit security, and slightly raised their deposits. However, in the aftermath of the crisis the enhanced depositor knowledge proved to be non-permanent while the increased importance of deposit security and the exposure of depositors persisted. The proportion of completely uninformed, strongly involved, and highly exposed depositors, who carry the highest risk of triggering a bank run, was reduced around the peak of the crisis but rebounded strongly afterwards, even exceeding pre-crisis levels. These findings point to a higher bank run risk in the aftermath than during the financial crisis.