We examine how firms' reliance on Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs), either by registering or setting up subsidiaries in OFCs, affects their financial performance. Using multilevel mixed (fixed and random) effects regressions, we provide evidence that is consistent with the agency costs of tax avoidance. Information asymmetry and lax legal environments in OFCs offset tax benefits, especially for firms directly registered in OFCs. Firms directly registered in OFCs are valued 14% lower than onshore firms, while firms with subsidiaries in OFCs enjoy an 11% higher valuation than onshore firms. However, it appears that investors do not fully appreciate the extent of the agency costs due to increased information asymmetry of firms that set up subsidiaries in OFCs. We argue that the assessment of firm value must encompass the registration status of its subsidiaries rather than the parent company's origin.

ABSTRACT We investigate how owners of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) perceive, make sense of, and practice risk management. Drawing on Schatzki's practice theory, we theorize on how and why risk management happens in SMEs. Thus, we fill a gap in the extant literature, which focuses almost exclusively on risk management within large organizations. We interview entrepreneurs and conduct site observations to gain insight into their risk management activities, the drivers that lead to the adoption of said activities, their attitudes toward risk management, and how their accountants may shape and contribute to risk management in SMEs. We find that rather than a specific set of formal processes, entrepreneurs view risk management as a mindset that emphasizes the preservation of key assets, creation of competitive advantages, and development of local talent and expertise. We observe practices that are mainly informal yet planned, deliberate, and fully integrated within the fabric of organizations that align with ideal forms of risk management. We also find that full‐time, in‐house accountants do help entrepreneurs with risk management, while external accountants, whose main activities relate to financial statement preparation and tax filings, do not systematically help entrepreneurs manage risk. We contribute to both the theory and practice of risk management by sharing empirical insights into how SME owners perceive, make sense of, and manage risk.

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.

This paper examines the impact of product failures on the pricing of bank loans using hand-collected data on product recalls. We find that banks tend to charge higher loan prices for firms involved in product recalls. Uncertainty as to a recall's ultimate impact on a firm's credit risk conditions banks’ loan-pricing reaction, as reflected in a firm's default risk, information asymmetry and governance deficiency, and by the damage to its reputation, arising from the recall. Further analysis reveals that the impact of product recalls on the cost of debt is stronger in firms that rely more extensively on bank financing, firms with more severe recalls, and those adopting passive recall strategies. However, medical device firms, for which product recalls are often considered a normal part of doing business, do not experience a rise in their bank financing costs following a recall. Finally, we find that recall firms experience a deterioration in their financial performance and a rise in product lawsuits post recall. Overall, our findings shed new light on the economic consequences of product failures through the lens of creditors.