This paper demonstrates that the behavior of the conventional Phelps-Taylor model of overlapping wage contracts stands in stark contrast with important features of U. S. macro data for inflation and output. In particular, the Phelps-Taylor specification implies far too little inflation persistence. We present a new contracting model, in which agents are concerned with relative real wages, that is data-consistent. In a specification that nests both models, we resoundingly reject the conventional contracting model, but cannot reject the new contracting model.

We argue that long-term debt has a role in controlling management's ability to finance future investments. Companies with high (widely held) debt will find it hard to raise capital, since new security-holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors; conversely for companies with low debt. We show that there is an optimal debt--equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments. We derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long-term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior.

The literature on contracts predicts that some principals will pay agents rents, that is, amounts larger than those necessary to keep the agent in the contract. We calculated the earnings of the average franchisee in seventy franchise systems in various industries to determine whether rents are paid as a solution to the agency problem in franchise contracts. We found that many but not all systems paid rents, both ex post and ex ante, to the average franchisee. The results confirm those of Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994), who found rents associated with McDonald's, but the magnitude of rents within the systems we study was generally much lower than those of McDonald's.

The authors present a structural model of the U.S. economy that combines their price-contracting specification with a term-structure relationship, an aggregate demand curve, and a monetary-policy reaction function. The model matches important features of postwar data well and provides a structural explanation of the correlation between real output and the short-term nominal rate of interest. The authors perform a battery of monetary-policy experiments that show that, as viewed through the lens of this model, monetary policy has struck a good balance recently among competing monetary-policy objectives. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

We present a structural model of the U.S. economy that combines our price-contracting specification with a term-structure relationship, an aggregate demand curve, and a monetary-policy reaction function. The model matches important features of postwar data well and provides a structural explanation of the correlation between real output and the short-term nominal rate of interest. We perform a battery of monetary-policy experiments which show that, as viewed through the lens of this model, monetary policy has struck a good balance recently among competing monetary-policy objectives.