Populism at the country level is at an all-time high, with more than 25 percent of nations currently governed by populists. How do economies perform under populist leaders? We build a new long-run cross-country database to study the macroeconomic history of populism. We identify 51 populist presidents and prime ministers from 1900 to 2020 and show that the economic cost of populism is high. After 15 years, GDP per capita is 10 percent lower compared to a plausible nonpopulist counterfactual. Economic disintegration, decreasing macroeconomic stability, and the erosion of institutions typically go hand in hand with populist rule. (JEL D72, E23, N10, N40, O43)

Does international financial integration boost economic growth? The empirical literature has not yet established a robust link between openness to the international capital market and economic growth. In this paper, we turn to the economic history of the first era of financial globalization (1880–1914) for new insights. Using identical empirical models and techniques as contemporary studies, we find a significant growth effect in the historical period. A key difference between now and then is that opening up to the international market led to net capital movements and higher investment in the historical period, but it no longer does so today.

The financial crisis has refocused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. We study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a new historical dataset for 14 countries over the years 1870–2008. Total credit has increased strongly relative to output and money in the second half of the twentieth century. Monetary policy responses to financial crises have also been more aggressive, but the output costs of crises have remained large. Credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises, suggesting that policymakers ignore credit at their peril. JEL: E32, E44, E52, G01, N10, N20

How have house prices evolved over the long run? This paper presents annual house prices for 14 advanced economies since 1870. We show that real house prices stayed constant from the nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, but rose strongly and with substantial cross-country variation in the second half of the twentieth century. Land prices, not replacement costs, are the key to understanding the trajectory of house prices. Rising land prices explain about 80 percent of the global house price boom that has taken place since World War II. Our findings have implications for the evolution of wealth-to-income ratios, the growth effects of agglomeration, and the price elasticity of housing supply. (JEL C43, N10, N90, R31)

This paper introduces a new long-run data set based on archival data from historical waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. Studying the joint distribution of household income and wealth, we expose the central importance of portfolio composition and asset prices for wealth dynamics in postwar America. Asset prices shift the wealth distribution because of systematic differences in household portfolios along the wealth distribution. Middle-class portfolios are dominated by housing, while rich households predominantly own business equity. Differential changes in equity and house prices shaped wealth dynamics in postwar America and decoupled the income and wealth distribution over extended periods.

Abstract The racial wealth gap is the largest of the economic disparities between Black and white Americans, with a white-to-Black per capita wealth ratio of 6 to 1. It is also among the most persistent. In this article, we construct the first continuous series on white-to-Black per capita wealth ratios from 1860 to 2020, drawing on historical census data, early state tax records, and historical waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances, among other sources. Incorporating these data into a parsimonious model of wealth accumulation for each racial group, we document the role played by initial conditions, income growth, savings behavior, and capital returns in the evolution of the gap. Given vastly different starting conditions under slavery, racial wealth convergence would remain a distant scenario, even if wealth-accumulating conditions had been equal across the two groups since Emancipation. Relative to this equal-conditions benchmark, we find that observed convergence has followed an even slower path over the past 150 years, with convergence stalling after 1950. Since the 1980s, the wealth gap has widened again as capital gains have predominantly benefited white households, and convergence via income growth and savings has come to a halt.

Abstract Do periods of persistently loose monetary policy increase financial fragility and the likelihood of a financial crisis? This is a central question for policymakers, yet the literature does not provide systematic empirical evidence about this link at the aggregate level. In this article, we fill this gap by analysing long-run historical data. We find that when the stance of monetary policy is accommodative over an extended period, the likelihood of financial turmoil in the medium term increases considerably. We investigate the causal pathways that lead to this result and argue that credit creation and asset price overheating are important intermediating channels.

Abstract Debt overhang is associated with higher financial fragility and slower recovery from recession. However, while household credit booms have been extensively documented to have this property, we find that corporate debt does not fit the same pattern. Newly collected data on nonfinancial business liabilities for 18 advanced economies over the past 150 years shows that, in the aggregate, greater frictions in corporate debt resolution make for slower recoveries, with weak investment and more persistent “zombie firms” and that this is an important factor in explaining the difference in outcomes relative to household credit booms.

We assemble a new dataset spanning 150 years and 60 countries to study the economic toll of war. A war of average intensity is associated with an output drop of close to 10 percent in the war-site economy, while consumer prices rise by approximately 20 percent. The capital stock, total factor productivity, and equity returns all decline sharply. The economic ramifications of war are not confined to the war site. The evidence points to adverse economic outcomes in other belligerent and third-party countries if they are exposed to the war site through trade linkages or share a common border. (JEL D74, E23, E32, F43, F51, N40)

ABSTRACT This paper makes the first comprehensive attempt to study within‐country heterogeneity of housing returns. We introduce a new city‐level data set covering 15 OECD countries over 150 years and show that national housing markets are characterized by systematic spatial variation in housing returns. Total returns in large agglomerations are close to 100 basis points lower per year than in other parts of the same country. Excess returns outside the large cities can be rationalized as compensation for higher risk, especially higher covariance with income growth and lower liquidity. Real estate in diversified large agglomerations is comparatively safe.