[This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor countrylevel investor protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when creditor protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak creditor protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor protections and facilitate access to external finance.]

Are restrictive covenants effective mechanisms in mitigating agency problems? Is the magnitude of the increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems non-trivial? We tackle these questions using a large dataset of public bonds. Contrary to the view that restrictive covenants in public bond contracts are standard boilerplates that serve little purpose, we find significant benefits in terms of reduction in the cost of debt associated with covenants. Restrictions on investment activities or issuance of higher priority claims reduce the cost of debt by about 35–75 basis points. These findings suggest that investors view bond covenants as important instruments in mitigating agency problems, and an increase in the cost of debt due to agency problems could be substantial. Additionally, we find that high growth firms and firms with low probability of default are less likely to include covenants suggesting that the costs of covenants outweigh benefits for these types of firms.

[We use a movie industry project-by-project dataset to analyze the choice of financing a project internally versus financing it through outside alliances. The results indicate that project risk is positively correlated with alliance formation. Movie studios produce a variety of films and tend to develop their safest projects internally. Our findings are consistent with internal capital market explanations. We find mixed evidence regarding resource pooling, i.e., sharing the cost of large projects. Finally, the evidence shows that projects developed internally perform similarly to projects developed through outside alliances.]

This paper examines the influence of capital structure change on the value creation from asset sales. We find significant positive equity and debt excess returns are concentrated in the subsample of highly leveraged firms that use the proceeds to retire debt. Low leverage firms display no consistent significant excess equity or bond returns. The existent literature has focused on efficiency redistribution, increase in focus, and access to capital for investment as the primary drivers of value creation from asset sales and agency costs as a major factor that mitigates this value creation. The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the primary driver of value creation is from capital structure change for highly leveraged firms.

We investigate the Dead Hand Proxy Put, a contractual innovation in corporate debt agreements that may impact hedge fund activism. We find the provision principally in loans, not bonds, and provide evidence linking the adoption of the provision to hedge fund activism. Furthermore, controlling for endogeneity, we find that the provision significantly reduces the cost of loans. Bondholder wealth also increases. Moreover, cross-sectional analysis of share returns reveals that the provision is positively associated with repeat banking relationships and negatively associated with free cash flow problems, suggesting a cost-benefit tradeoff.

This article studies the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor protections. Using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, we find that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when creditor protection laws are weak. Further, the use of restrictive covenants in weak creditor protection countries is associated with a lower cost of debt. We also find that strong country-level shareholder rights are not necessarily harmful to bondholders. Overall, the findings suggest that issuers and investors can create international contracts that overcome some of the deficiencies of country-level investor protections and facilitate access to external finance.

We compare investment policies across public and private firms in different institutional settings. Using a large cross-country data set, we find that public listed firms are better positioned to take advantage of growth opportunities than private firms. Specifically, public listed firms exhibit higher investment sensitivity to growth opportunities than private firms. This differential, however, only exists in countries with well-developed stock markets. Furthermore, the relative advantage public firms have at allocating capital depends on the degree of agency costs and reliance on external equity.

We use a movie industry project-by-project dataset to analyze the choice of financing a project internally versus financing it through outside alliances. The results indicate that project risk is positively correlated with alliance formation. Movie studios produce a variety of films and tend to develop their safest projects internally. Our findings are consistent with internal capital market explanations. We find mixed evidence regarding resource pooling, i.e., sharing the cost of large projects. Finally, the evidence shows that projects developed internally perform similarly to projects developed through outside alliances.

We examine a link between bond exchange-traded fund (ETF) creation and redemption processes and the underlying bond market liquidity. Using daily creation and redemption data, we find that including a bond in a creation or redemption basket has a favorable impact on the bond’s liquidity for both high-yield and investment-grade markets. The improvement in liquidity persists during times of market stress with this impact being stronger for redemptions than creations. Our results suggest that ETF mispricing arbitrage explains the improvement in bond liquidity. However, we also find evidence that transaction costs and bond inventory management limit the ETF arbitrage.

We contend that high borrowing costs can overwhelm precautionary motives and induce low cash holdings in private firms. Supportive of our hypothesis, we find European private firms hold less cash than public firms and this differential relates to borrowing costs. Results are robust to endogeneity concerns and reveal private firms use cash flow to pay-down existing debt instead of building cash reserves. Further, stronger creditor rights and debt market development lead to convergence in cash policies of private and public firms.