In a sudden rush of unilateral declarations the 200-mile fishing limit in 1977 became the accepted norm in world practice and thus in international law. The Third Law of the Sea Conference-deadlocked on nonfisheries issues-so far has failed to produce a new international convention. But from its deliberations has emerged an Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), the fisheries provisions of which have been received with nearuniversal support or acquiescence. Several countries-including Canada and the United States-have indicated that they will adhere to the rules of the ICNT in administering their 200-mile fishing zones. H. Scott Gordon's analysis that open access exploitation of a common property fish stock attracts excessive effort, leading to dissipation of resource rents, is now widely accepted. A major justification for extended jurisdiction is that it gives coastal states property rights over fish stocks that previously were international common property. By limiting access and managing effort wisely, coastal states may stop overexploitation and regenerate net economic benefits. Increasing pressure on the world's resources has greatly enhanced the potential value of the available fish stocks and thus the incentive for coastal states to claim the benefits of exploitation for their own nationals (see Francis Christy).