This paper analyzes the important time variation in US aggregate household portfolios. To do so, we first use flexible descriptions of preferences and investment opportunities to derive household optimal decision rules that nest static, myopic, and non-myopic portfolio allocations. We then compare these rules to the data through formal statistical analysis. Our main results reveal that: (i) static and myopic investment behaviors are rejected, (ii) non-myopic portfolio allocations are supported, and (iii) the Fama–French factors best explain empirical portfolio shares.

This paper develops a consumption-based asset pricing model in which attitudes towards risk are contingent upon the state of the world. For a low (high) level of consumption relative to a subjective metric, counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical) risk aversion implies that consumption shocks generate larger fluctuations in marginal utility, against which the agent will hedge in choosing his optimal portfolio. Asset prices are studied using two-state Markov preference regimes where bull and bear markets reflect alternating periods of low and high risk aversion. Joint estimation of bond and stock prices highlights moderate and infrequent movements in risk aversion, and a marked improvement on the model's ability to capture the cyclical nature of observed asset prices. Resume: Ce papier developpe un modele d'agent representatif de valorisation des actifs dans lequel les preferences sont contingentes a l'etat du monde. Lorsque la consommation est basse (elevee) par rapport a un niveau subjectif, une aversion contra- (pro-) cyclique implique que des chocs a la consommation se traduisent par des fluctuations accentuees de l'utilite marginale que l'agent desirera lisser lors de son choix du portefeuille optimal. Les prix des actifs sont etudies dans le cadre d'un modele markovien a deux etats ou les marches haussiers ou baissiers refletent des periodes alternatives de basse et de haute aversion pour le risque. L'estimation conjointe des prix des bons et des actions mettent en evidence des mouvements moderes et peu frequents dans l'aversion au risque ainsi qu'une amelioration nette du modele en ce qui a trait aux mouvements cycliques des prix.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection. This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicative of information asymmetry. We then test for adverse selection using sale motivation. Our results indicate large discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales. Consistent with adverse selection, the market anticipated that predominantly low-productivity slaves would be brought to the market in voluntary sales.