We analyze how the inflow of TARP funds in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis impacted banks’ interbank market activity. We show that TARP banks’ interbank market activity was impacted in a statistically and economically significant way. Their interbank lending via federal funds sold increased by 77 percent relative to the mean of the control group of non-TARP banks. We further show that among the TARP banks, the most affected ones also increased credit risk taking, while at the same time not increasing profitability. These findings suggest a new, heretofore not investigated channel through which TARP may have increased banks’ moral hazard incentives.

Using a rich dataset from a commercial bank in Albania, we utilize the introduction of a public credit registry by the Albanian central bank in January 2008 as a natural experiment to analyze the effect of information sharing between lenders on (1) access to credit, (2) cost of credit, and (3) loan performance. Our results suggest that information sharing by means of a credit registry does not affect access to or cost of credit, but improves loan performance. Specifically, loans granted after the introduction of the credit registry are 3% points less likely of turning problematic, representing a 35% reduction of the overall sample average arrear probability. We further find that the effect is more pronounced for repeat borrowers and in areas, where competition is weak. This indicates that information sharing among lenders improves loan performance mainly by disciplining borrowers to repay in their concern about future access to credit.

This paper investigates whether the stock market reacts to unsolicited ratings for a sample of firms rated by S&P between January 1996 and December 2005. We first analyze the stock market reaction to the assignment of an initial unsolicited rating. We find evidence that this reaction is negative and particularly accentuated for small Japanese firms. We then analyze the stock market reaction to changes in unsolicited ratings for a Japanese sub-sample and find that here too the stock market reacts negatively. Our results imply that unsolicited ratings convey new information to the stock market and that investors react to this information. Although unsolicited ratings are based on publicly available information only, the stock market seems to be inefficient in processing this information for Japanese companies.

Using a unique data set for a commercial bank in Albania, we analyze gender differences in loan officers’ performance. Loans screened and monitored by female loan officers have a lower likelihood to turn problematic than loans handled by male loan officers. This effect cannot be explained by borrower or loan officer selection or differences in screening, work load, and experience. However, while the performance gap always exists for female borrowers, female loan officers only gain a performance advantage with male borrowers with experience and do not have an advantage with borrowers that are legal entities. We therefore interpret this as suggestive evidence for female loan officers’ better capacity to build trust relationships with borrowers.

This paper examines why unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ratings. Both self-selection among issuers and strategic conservatism of rating agencies may be reasonable explanations. Analyses of default incidences of non-U.S. borrowers between January 1996 and December 2006 show that rating conservatism may play a role for industrial firms, but self-selection cannot be fully rejected. Neither can it for insurance companies, though data restrictions impede further conclusions. For unsolicited bank ratings, however, we find strong evidence that rating conservatism is an important cause. The downward bias also appears to increase along with banks’ opaqueness.

This paper studies the effects of gender interactions on the supply of and demand for credit using data from a large Albanian lender. We document that first-time borrowers assigned to officers of the opposite sex are less likely to return for a second loan. The effect is larger when officers have little prior exposure to borrowers of the other gender and when they have more discretion to act on their gender beliefs, as proxied by financial market competition and branch size. We also find that first-time borrowers matched with opposite-sex officers pay higher interest rates and receive smaller and shorter-maturity loans, but do not experience higher arrears. Our results are consistent with the existence of a gender bias and learning effects that lead to the disappearance of the bias.

A key problem facing microlenders is the high level of information asymmetry between them and their borrowers. In this paper, we analyze whether the relationship intensity between microlenders and borrowers helps to overcome existing information asymmetries and how this impacts access to credit and loan contract terms. Using a rich loan-level data set provided by a microlender in Mozambique for the years 2000–2006, we find that access to credit improves and that the loan approval process takes less time when relationships become more intense. Borrowers further profit from a more intense relationship through lower guarantee requirements. All effects are more pronounced the more opaque the borrowers are. These results suggest that longer lending relationships indeed help to reduce information asymmetries and that this is beneficial for microborrowers.

Recent regulatory efforts aim at lowering the cyclicality of bank lending because of its potentially detrimental effects on financial stability and the real economy. We investigate the cyclicality of SME lending of local banks with versus without a public mandate, controlling for location, size, loan maturity, capitalization, funding structure, liquidity, profitability, and credit demand-side factors. The public mandate is set by local governments and stipulates a sustainable provision of financial services to local customers and a deviation from strict profit maximization. We find that banks with a public mandate are 25% less cyclical than other local banks. The result is credit supply-side driven and especially strong for public mandate banks with high liquidity and stable deposit funding. Our findings have implications for the bank structure, financial stability and the finance-growth nexus in a local context.

We reassess the recent finding that no established portfolio strategy outperforms the naively diversified portfolio, 1/N, by developing a constrained minimum-variance portfolio strategy on a shrinkage theory based framework. Our results show that our constrained minimum-variance portfolio yields significantly lower out-of-sample variances than many established minimum-variance portfolio strategies. Further, we observe that our portfolio strategy achieves higher Sharpe ratios than 1/N, amounting to an average Sharpe ratio increase of 32.5% across our six empirical datasets. We find that our constrained minimum-variance strategy is the only strategy that achieves the goal of improving the Sharpe ratio of 1/N consistently and significantly. At the same time, our developed portfolio strategy achieves a comparatively low turnover and exhibits no excessive short interest.

We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.