This paper investigates how firms that made initial public offerings of equity between 1975 and 1984 report earnings. For a sample of 489 firms, we find a positive association between a proxy for income smoothing and firm performance. That is, firms that perform well tend to report earnings with less variability relative to cash from operations compared to other firms. In addition, the five-year earnings response coefficient is greater for firms that are able to smooth earnings relative to cash flows. This result is consistent with a hypothesis that the market makes better assessments of the information content of earnings for firms with smoother earnings. Finally, we show that IPO firms tend to use discretionary accruals to smooth income relative to the prior year's earnings.

This paper seeks to provide an explanation for why corporate officers manage the disclosure of accounting information. We show that earnings management affects firm value when value-maximizing managers and investors are asymmetrically informed. In equilibrium, the strategic management of reported earnings influences investors' assessments of the market values of companies' shares.

In this article we investigate the impact of the Enron audit failure on auditor reputation. Specifically, we examine Arthur Andersen’s clients’ stock market impact surrounding various dates on which Andersen’s audit procedures and independence were under severe scrutiny. On the three days following Andersen’s admission that a significant number of documents had been shredded, we find that Andersen’s other clients experienced a statistically negative market reaction, suggesting that investors downgraded the quality of the audits performed by Andersen. We also find that audits performed by Andersen’s Houston office suffered a more severe decline in abnormal returns on this date. We are not able to show that Andersen’s independence was questioned by the amount of non–audit fees charged to its clients.

This paper reports the results of an empirical investigation of the effect of firm size on the magnitude of the long‐window earnings response coefficient (ERC). In contrast to earlier studies, we find that size is positively related to the magnitude of the long‐window ERC. This result was robust across alternative event windows (12, 15, and 24‐months). The argument advanced in the literature has been that since more information is available throughout the year for large firms, a less pronounced market reaction occurs at the earnings announcement date. Our result is not inconsistent with this since we examined the relationship over a long window. It appears that the greater availability of alternative information sources and increased search activities about large firms, rather than resulting in a weaker ERC for large firms, may actually enhance or strengthen the magnitude of the long‐window ERC. Our intepretation of this finding is that the broader set of information available about large firms enables market participants to interpret the information in the financial statements more completely and to estimate future cash flows more accurately, leading to a decreased level of system uncertainty. In addition, we present evidence that the largest response coefficients are for large nonsurvivor firms while the smallest are for small firms, both survivors and nonsurvivors. Résumé. Les auteurs rapportent les résultats d'une analyse empirique de l'incidence de la taille de l'entreprise sur l'amplitude du coefficient de réponse des bénéfices (CRB) à longue échéance. Contrairement aux études précédentes, celle‐ci débouche sur la conclusion que la taille est en relation positive avec l'amplitude du CRB à longue échéance. Ce résultat persiste, quelle que soit la période d'événements choisie (12, 15 ou 24 mois). L'explication proposée dans les travaux précédents est la suivante: puisqu'il est possible d'obtenir davantage d'information tout au long de l'année au sujet d'une grande entreprise, la réaction du marche est moins prononcée à la date de la déclaration des bénéfices. Les résultats de l'étude ne sont pas contradictoires puisque les auteurs étudient la relation à longue échéance. II semble que l'eventail plus grand du choix de sources d'information et les activités de recherche plus importantes en ce qui a trait aux grandes entreprises, plutôt que de donner lieu à un CRB plus faible dans leur cas, puissent en fait favoriser ou renforcer l'amplitude du CRB à longue échéance. Les auteurs en déduisent que le réservoir d'information plus large dont on dispose au sujet des grandes entreprises permet aux intervenants sur le marché d'interpréter les renseignements fournis dans les états financiers de façon plus complète et de mieux estimer les flux monétaires éventuels, ce qui conduit à une réduction de l'incertitude relative au système. De plus, les auteurs démontrent que les coefficients de réponse les plus élevés sont ceux des grandes entreprises qui ne survivent pas, tandis que les coefficients de réponse les plus faibles sont ceux des entreprises plus petites, qu'elles survivent ou non.

[We compare clients' realignment decisions in markets permitting direct uninvited solicitation (allowed markets) and markets prohibiting such practices (banned markets), providing insight into the effects of increased competition on client-auditor alignment. We argue that solicitation influences realignment decisions if clients do not invite nonincumbents to submit proposals, and if net economies are available (i. e., the cost savings from switching auditors exceeds any transactions costs incurred in realignment). By examining realignments among Big 8 auditors during the period 1980 through 1988, and by controlling for other variables associated with auditor switching, we are able to focus on the effects of solicitation in a setting of homogeneous audit quality and diversity in state boards' direct solicitation rules. We find that realignment occurs more frequently in the allowed market than in the banned market. Thus, in markets where auditors are allowed to approach prospective clients with proposals, clients become better informed and the outcome may be reduced inefficiencies.]

The frequency and magnitude of restructuring charges have drawn the attention of various groups of users of accounting information. Prior studies on restructuring charges have focused on the market's response to the announcement of the charge. In contrast, we examine the charges from the perspective of financial analysts. We provide evidence that analysts expect declining performance for restructuring firms in the short run but possible improvement over the longer term. When we examine forecast errors in the year following the charge, we find evidence that the analysts’ accuracy has declined and, despite the downward revision, analysts are still optimistically biased.

We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample.

Prior research has examined audit pricing for publicly held firms and provided some evidence of a Big 8 premium in pricing. We investigate audit pricing among private firms, and provide evidence that private firms do not pay such a premium on average. The relatively greater degree of dispersion in auditor choice (between Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors) in our large sample of privately held audit clients allows us to predict the auditor choice for each firm and to control for potential self-selection. We reject the null hypothesis that clients are randomly allocated across Big 5 and non-Big 5 auditors. Using standard OLS regressions, we document a Big 5 premium; however this premium vanishes once we control for self-selection bias. Moreover, we find that client firms choosing Big 5 auditors generally would have faced higher fees had they chosen non-Big 5 auditors, given their firm-specific characteristics. Our results are consistent with audit markets for private firms being segmented along cost-effective lines. Further, our results suggest that auditees in our setting do not, on average, view Big 5 auditors as superior in terms of the perceived quality of the services provided to a degree significant enough to warrant a fee premium.