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Tiebout Bias and the Demand for Local Public Schooling

The Review of Economics and Statistics 1987 69(3), 426 open access
Until recently, estimates of demand functions for public goods were obtained (either with aggregate or micro survey data) using single equation estimation techniques. However, demand estimates may be biased when in dividuals' choices of communities are dependent upon the quantity and quality of public good provided. This paper spells out the nature of this bias (called Tiebout bias) and suggests an improved maximum-likelihood estimation technique. The technique is applied to a data set involving local public education in Michigan. Copyright 1987 by MIT Press.

Micro-Based Estimates of Demand Functions for Local School Expenditures

Econometrica 1982 50(5), 1183
We devise and apply a new method for estimating demand for local public goods from survey data. Individuals' responses to questions about whether they wanted more, less, or the same amount of various local public goods are combined with observations of their incomes, tax rates, and the amounts of actual spending in their home communities. Parameter estimates turn out to be quite similar to those found with studies like Bergstrom and Goodman's study based on total expenditures across communities.

The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1984 99(1), 71
The analysis focuses on the question of whether the payment of compensation for land taken by eminent domain is efficient. When the taking decision is independent of land use, zero compensation is efficient, but full compensation is not. When the project decision is no longer independent of land use, and can be affected by investor decisions, neither compensation rule is generally efficient because of the moral hazard problem. With risk-averse consumers and risk-neutral firms, the previous conclusions remain essentially unchanged. However, when the project decision rule involves a budgetary “fiscal illusion,” additional compensation may be necessary to correct the incentives facing the project decision-maker.