Using confidential tax shelter and tax return data obtained from the Internal Revenue Service, this study develops and validates an expanded model for inferring the likelihood that a firm engages in a tax shelter. Results show that tax shelter likelihood is positively related to subsidiaries located in tax havens, foreign-source income, inconsistent book-tax treatment, litigation losses, use of promoters, profitability, and size, and negatively related to leverage. Supplemental tests show that total book-tax differences (BTDs) and the contingent tax liability reserve are significantly related to tax shelter usage, while discretionary permanent BTDs and long-run cash effective tax rates are not. Finally, the model is weaker, yet still significant, in the FIN 48 disclosure environment. This research provides investors and policymakers with an extended, validated measure to calculate the presence of extreme cases of corporate tax aggressiveness. Such information could also aid analysts and other tax and non-tax researchers in assessing the benefits and risks of firm behavior.

This study examines the empirical relation between voluntary participation in the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) Compliance Assurance Process (CAP) audit program, and tax uncertainty disclosed in financial statements pursuant to Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48). Based on the findings of prior analytical and empirical research, we formulate and test hypotheses about the likelihood of voluntary CAP participation and the resulting effect on FIN 48 tax reserves. We find that firms with moderate-sized FIN 48 reserves are more likely to participate in CAP than firms with either small or large reserves, indicating an inverted U-shaped relation between CAP participation rates and firms' tax reserves. After controlling for non-random sample selection, we find that CAP firms significantly reduce their FIN 48 reserves by about 16.5 percent relative to non-CAP firms. However, this reduction is concentrated among firms with moderate-sized FIN 48 reserves. These cross-sectional differences are consistent with FIN 48 reserves reflecting both tax uncertainty and tax aggressiveness. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M48; H25. Data Availability: FIN 48 data and confidential tax data on CAP participants are obtained from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Large Business & International (LB&I), Planning, Analysis, Inventory, and Research Division (PAIR). The CAP data are not publicly available; the FIN 48 data were compiled and validated by the IRS and made available to one of the authors. All other data are available from public sources identified in this treatise. Because tax data are confidential and protected by data nondisclosure agreements under the Internal Revenue Code, all statistics are presented in the aggregate; no statistics with three or fewer observations are disclosed. Any opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IRS.

We examine how tax cuts that benefit some firms are related to the economic performance of their direct competitors. Consistent with tax cuts decreasing the cost of initiating competitive strategies, we find that a decrease in the tax burden for only a specific group of firms in the U.S. economy (i.e., “rivals”) has a negative economic effect on the performance of its direct competitors not directly exposed to the same tax cut (i.e., “competitors”). This negative externality is stronger when the relatively higher taxed competitors (1) are financially constrained, (2) operate in more competitive markets, (3) have similar products to their lower taxed rivals, (4) face rivals that retain more of their cash tax savings due to lower dividends and share repurchases, and (5) face lower taxed, but financially constrained, rivals. We also find that shareholders and lenders price the negative externality manifested in these competitors’ economic performance.

This study uses a comprehensive panel of tax returns to examine the financial reporting choices of medium‐to‐large private U.S. firms, a setting that controls over $9 trillion in capital, vastly outnumbers public U.S. firms across all industries, yet has no financial reporting mandates. We find that nearly two‐thirds of these firms do not produce audited GAAP financial statements. Guided by an agency theory framework, we find that size, ownership dispersion, external debt, and trade credit are positively associated with the choice to produce audited GAAP financial statements, while asset tangibility, age, and internal debt are generally negatively related to this choice. Our findings reveal that (1) equity capital and trade credit exhibit significant explanatory power, suggesting that the primary focus in the literature on debt is too narrow; (2) firm youth, growth, and R&D are positively associated with audited GAAP reporting, reflecting important monitoring roles of financial reporting; and (3) many firms violate standard explanations for financial reporting choices and substantial unexplained heterogeneity in financial reporting remains. We conclude by identifying opportunities for future research.

We use a proprietary data set of financial statements collected by banks to examine whether economic growth is related to the use of financial statement verification in debt financing. Exploiting the distinct economic growth and contraction patterns of the construction industry over the years 2002–2011, our estimates reveal that banks reduced their collection of unqualified audited financial statements from construction firms at nearly twice the rate of firms in other industries during the housing boom period before 2008. This reduction was most severe in the regions that experienced the most significant construction growth. These trends reversed during the subsequent housing crisis in 2008–2011 when construction activity contracted. Moreover, using bank‐ and firm‐level data, we find a strong negative (positive) relation between audited financial statements during the growth period, and subsequent loan losses (construction firm survival) during the contraction period. Collectively, our results reveal that macroeconomic fluctuations produce temporal shifts in the overall level of financial statement verification and temporal shifts in verification are related to bank loan portfolio quality and borrower performance.

This study provides the first large‐sample evidence on the economic tax effects of special purpose entities (SPEs). These increasingly common organizational structures facilitate corporate tax savings by enabling sponsor firms to increase tax‐advantaged activities and/or enhance their tax efficiency (i.e., relative tax savings of a given activity). Using path analysis, we find that SPEs facilitate greater tax avoidance such that an economically large amount of cash tax savings from research and development (R&D), depreciable assets, net operating loss carryforwards, intangible assets, foreign operations, and tax havens occur in conjunction with SPE use. We estimate that SPEs help generate over $330 billion of incremental cash tax savings, or roughly 6 percent of total U.S. federal corporate income tax collections during the sample period. Interaction analyses reveal that SPEs enhance the tax efficiency of intangibles and R&D by 61.5 percent to 87.5 percent. Overall, these findings provide economic insight into complex organizational structures supporting corporate tax avoidance.

Subchapter C of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code levies an entity‐level tax on corporate profits, whereas Subchapter S allows corporations meeting specific criteria to elect out of this tax. Despite these differences, C and S corporations regularly compete for customers and capital. We examine whether and the extent to which competition from S corporations influences the future organizational form choice of rival C corporations and explore outcomes of this choice. Using data for 4,462 private U.S. commercial banks grouped by Metropolitan Statistical Area during 1997–2010, we find that greater competition from S corporation banks increases the likelihood that rival C corporation banks convert to Subchapter S status. We estimate that the aggregate first‐year tax savings from S conversion exceed $372 million. Consistent with these savings being used to maintain competitive parity with rivals, we find that converting banks increase their interest rates on customer deposits and advertising intensity. Our findings provide insight into whether competition from tax‐advantaged firms influences the organizational form choice of rival tax‐disadvantaged firms.

We examine whether public disclosures of tax reserves recently made available through Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) reflect corporate tax shelter activities. Understanding this relation is important to corporate stakeholders and researchers keen to infer the aggressive nature of a firm's tax positions from its tax reserve accrual. Our study links public disclosures of tax reserves with mandatory private disclosures of tax shelter participation as made to the Internal Revenue Service's Office of Tax Shelter Analysis. We find strong, robust evidence that the tax reserve is positively associated with tax shelters, while other commonly used measures of tax avoidance are not. Based on out‐of‐sample tests, we also show that the reserve is a suitable summary measure for predicting tax shelters. The tax benefits of tax shelters are economically significant, accounting for up to 48% of the aggregate FIN 48 tax reserves in our sample.

There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether firms that are aggressive in their financial reporting exhibit more or less tax aggressiveness. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the association between aggressive tax reporting and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. Relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness to triangulate our evidence, we generally find that tax aggressive U.S. public firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud. However, we caution that our results are sensitive to how tax aggressiveness is measured. More specifically, four (two) of the five (three) proxies for firms’ effective tax rates (book‐tax differences) load positively (negatively) during the 1981–2001 period, implying that fraud firms are less tax aggressiveness. Our inferences persist when we isolate the 1995–2001 period in which accounting impropriety steeply rose and corporate tax compliance steeply fell. Moreover, we continue to find that tax aggressive firms are less apt to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements when we apply factor analysis to identify tax avoidance with a common factor extracted from the underlying proxies and match on propensity scores to ensure that the fraud and nonfraud samples have very similar nontax characteristics.

Prior research shows that contingent liabilities do not accurately predict future cash payments due to the managerial discretion afforded by accounting standards. We examine the extent to which current accounting guidance for a material contingent liability—the reserve for unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) under Financial Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48)—generates accruals that are predictive of future income tax cash outflows. We document that UTBs fully unwind as cash tax payments over the subsequent 5 years, suggesting that managers, on average, accurately incorporate their expectations of future tax liabilities. This result persists for firms that are (1) most affected by the implementation of FIN 48, (2) unable to impound detection risk into their reserves, (3) engaged in relatively more ex ante tax avoidance, (4) suspected to have engaged in earnings management through the tax accounts, and (5) subject to plausibly exogenous shocks to tax reporting. Overall, our results suggest that current accounting guidance under FIN 48 for contingent tax liabilities enables managers to accurately report, and financial statement users to reliably predict, future cash obligations.