This research examines in the laboratory a class of game-theoretic equilibrium models of private research and development (R&D). We formulate a stochastic model of R&D investment whose predictions can be examined by using laboratory experiments. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium of our operational model yields testable predictions about the effects of appropriability and market structure on R&D. The experimental results support the hypothesis that the degree of appropriability is inversely related to R&D spending. The results strongly support the hypothesis that an increase in group size yields greater aggregate R&D. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium is shown to be a good predictor of central tendencies in the experiments.

This paper examines the relationship between variations in group size and “free-riding” behavior in the voluntary provision of public goods. We examine experimentally two pertinent concepts: the marginal return to an individual from contributions to the public good, and the actual number of members in the group. Our results strongly support a hypothesis that increasing group size leads to a reduction in allocative efficiency when accompanied by a decrease in marginal return from the public good (as from crowding or an association of large groups with imperceptibility of marginal benefits). Our results do not support a pure numbers-in-the-group effect.

Asset Markets: How They Are Affected by Tournament Incentives for Individuals by Duncan James and R. Mark Isaac. Published in volume 90, issue 4, pages 995-1004 of American Economic Review, September 2000

Focuses on the reproduction of predatory pricing in laboratory environment. Definition on predatory pricing; Methods used to construct experimental design; Effect of predation on price increase and efficiency. Focuses on the reproduction of predatorypricing in laboratory environment. Definition on predatorypricing; Methods used to construct experimental design; Effect of predation on price increase and efficiency.