Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them.However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities.This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may, in fact, be excessive.I.

We examine a situation in which insurance is characterized by moral hazard. When market insurance is provided, supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends (unobservable to market insurers) will occur. When nonmarket insurers have no better information than market insurers, the mutual assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore dysfunctional. Alternatively, when nonmarket insurers can observe each other's effort perfectly, mutual assistance is beneficial. These results point to the potential importance of peer-monitoring mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard.

This paper investigates the economics of the transition of land from rural to urban use. A simple model is employed to examine the developer's problem: When and at what destiny should vacant land be developed to maximize the present value of the Land? A series of rules emerges from the analysis to the timing and density of new development. In the latter half of the paper, the rules are tested against recent Canadian experience and peform well.

This paper investigates the economics of the transition of land from rural to urban use. A simple model is employed to examine the developer's problem: When and at what destiny should vacant land be developed to maximize the present value of the Land? A series of rules emerges from the analysis to the timing and density of new development. In the latter half of the paper, the rules are tested against recent Canadian experience and peform well.

A multiperiod, general equilibrium model of the labor market is developed in which risk-averse workers are faced with job-related uncertainty and labor turnover is costly. If a worker is unlucky and suffers a bad job match, he quits and joins another firm, hoping that he will like its work environment more. Because the quality of a job match is unobservable, workers cannot insure against the risk of a bad match. The firm provides implicit insurance against job dissatisfaction, typically by paying workers more than their net marginal products in their early years with the firm and less subsequently. Since the probabilities of the insured-against events (the quit rates over time) are affected by the amount of such insurance provided, this implicit insurance is characterized by moral hazard. Individuals quit when in the absence of insurance they would not. The equilibrium contract balances out efficiency in risk bearing with efficiency in turnover incentives. We show that the equilibrium contract is not (constrained) efficient and indicate why.

This paper considers the modeling of road congestion subject to peak-load demand. The standard model contains ambiguities and is poorly specified. These problems can be eliminated by working with a structural model that explicitly treats the congestion technology and drivers' behavioral decisions. The paper provides a detailed analysis of a particular structural model--William Vickrey's model of bottleneck congestion in the morning rush-hour auto commute, extended to treat elastic (i.e., price-sensitive) demand--and examines some economic implications of the structural approach.

This paper investigates a representative landlord's profit-maximization problem in a stationary economy. The landlord must decide on the quality of his housing units at the time of construction, maintenance expenditure over the life of the building, and the time of demolition or rehabilitation. The analysis can be applied to other problems with similar economic structure, notably equipment and durable good maintenance, overhaul and replacement.

I. An example, 473.—II. The generality of the Henry George Theorem, 477.—III. On using land rents as a measure of the benefits from public goods, 490.—IV. Competitive attainability of a Pareto optimal distribution of economic activity, 496.—V. Concluding comments, 498.

We examine a situation in which insurance is characterized by moral hazard. When market insurance is provided, supplementary mutual assistance between family and friends (unobservable to market insurers) will occur. When nonmarket insurers have no better information than market insurers, the mutual assistance not only crowds out market insurance but is also harmful and therefore dysfunctional Alternatively, when nonmarket insurers can observe each other's effort perfectly, mutual assistance is beneficial These results point to the potential importance of peer-monitoring mechanisms in mitigating moral hazard.