In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.

Using a windstorm simulation model developed by Applied Insurance Research, we analyze the effectiveness of catastrophic-loss index options in hedging hurricane losses for Florida insurers. The results suggest that insurers in the two largest size quartiles can hedge losses almost as effectively using contracts based on four intrastate indices as they can using contracts that settle on their own losses. Many insurers in the third largest size quartile also can hedge effectively using the intrastate indices, but most insurers in the smallest quartile would encounter significant basis risk. Hedging using a statewide loss index is effective only for the largest insurers.

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs a rating scale distinct from that of the incumbent. It targets higher-than-average companies in each rating grade of the incumbent's rating scale and employs more stringent rating standards. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) entry into the market for insurance ratings previously covered by a monopolist, A.M. Best, to empirically test the impact of entry on the information content of ratings. The empirical analysis reveals that S&P required higher standards to assign a rating similar to the one assigned by A.M. Best and that higher-than-average quality insurers in each rating category of A.M. Best chose to receive a second rating from S&P.

In this paper we theoretically and empirically examine the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. A simple equilibrium model with costly financial distress suggests that as firms become more efficient at risky investments vis a vis low risk investments, they will borrow less, invest more in risky assets, and hedge more. The model also predicts a positive relationship between hedging and leverage – a result consistent with debt capacity arguments. We test the model empirically using a simultaneous equations framework to investigate the determinants of firm-level hedging, financing and investing decisions. The results strongly support the hypothesis that the hedging, financing and investment decisions are jointly determined. In addition, we find strong support for the central hypothesis that firms more efficient investing in risky technologies more aggressively hedge and use less debt financing in order to maximize their comparative advantage.