We show that an executive is optimistic about her company׳s prospects if and only if she retains some of the shares received whenever she exercises company stock options. Empirically, an indicator of optimism based on this idea matches the expected relations between optimism and corporate decision-making better than commonly used indicators based on the timing of option exercise. This makes sense, as our model of an executive׳s optimal option exercise and portfolio choice demonstrates that the timing of option exercise depends just as much on stock and other executive characteristics as it does on optimism.

We analyze participation decisions in employee stock purchase plans. These plans allow employees to buy company stock at a discount from the market price and resell it immediately for a sure profit. Although an average employee stands to gain $3,079 annually, only 30% of individuals take advantage of this risk-free opportunity. Participation is more likely among employees who are familiar with stocks, are more educated, are less financially constrained, and make fewer errors in valuing financial securities. Our results suggest that compensation plans requiring active decisions by individuals can result in poor financial outcomes for employees of lower socioeconomic status.

Abstract This paper examines CEO pay at nonprofits. Using compensation data for 14,111 nonprofits, we find that CEO pay dropped by 2% after legislation in New York reduced CEOs’ ability to influence their own pay. Despite lower pay, CEOs exerted more effort, and nonprofit performance improved. The effects were stronger at commercial nonprofits than at charities and for male CEOs than female CEOs. These findings are consistent with a model where some nonprofit CEOs derive meaning from their work and compensation can be rigged. Overall, our results suggest that regulation that targets the pay-setting process can improve organizational outcomes at nonprofits.

We identify the broker each corporate insider trades through, and find that analysts and mutual fund managers affiliated with such “inside brokers” have a substantial information advantage on the insider’s firm. Affiliated analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts, and affiliated mutual funds trade the insider’s stock more profitably than their peers, following insider trades through their brokerage. Notably, this advantage persists well after these insider trades are publicly disclosed. Our results challenge the prevalent perception that information asymmetry arising from insider trading is acute only before trade disclosure, and suggest that brokers facilitating these trades are in a position to exploit this asymmetry.

Abstract We investigate whether external industry tournament incentives influence the design of executive-compensation contracts. Using staggered negative mobility shocks as exogenous disruptions to tournament incentives, we show that firms treated by these shocks act to restore their executives’ diminished implicit risk-taking incentives by increasing compensation vega. On average, post-shock compensation vegas increase by approximately 10%. These effects are considerably larger for treated executives with strong tournament incentives and high ex ante mobility. Mobility shocks have no impact on compensation delta or total pay. Our results shed light on how explicit risk-taking incentives are optimized with respect to executive career concerns.