Central banks (CBs) in Europe and the US have been providing virtually unlimited amounts of liquidity to banks for quite some time now. This may lead banks to expect that these CBs will be lenient in the future. Will this expectation be justified? I present a model in which a commercial bank, subject to idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, faces uncertainty about whether the CB is tough (Hawk) or lenient (Dove). Specifically, the CB knows its nature, but the bank does not. When uncertainty is high, the CB can use this to its advantage and try to build a reputation for toughness. In response, the bank chooses higher liquidity reserves in equilibrium. Furthermore, increasing bank capital and penalty rates make it easier to build a reputation, while bailouts by the fiscal government make it more difficult.

A main cause of the crisis of 2007–2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.