This paper presents a model of the portfolio and financing adjustments of U.S. banks over the business cycle. At the core of the model is a moral hazard problem between depositors/bank regulators and stockholders. The solution to this problem takes the form of shared management of the bank. Stockholders manage the bank's portfolio and the regulator manages the financing of the portfolio. The model predicts that portfolio adjustments are made to conform to the risk aversion of shareholders and financing adjustments are made to offset changes in portfolio risk. Regression evidence for 1955–2000 fails to reject these predictions.

This paper describes the balance sheet adjustments of debt and equity financed firms over time in an economy subject to taste shocks. A model is developed that describes a representative firm with a stochastic diminishing returns technology and a set of financial contracts that resolve a conflict-of-interest problem between differentially risk-averse bondholders and stockholders. The contractual resolution of this conflict-of-interest problem between the two agents is shown to shape certain stylized facts of business cycles ignored in Keynesian and Classical models. Changes in investor risk aversion and equity valuations trigger real investment decisions that can cause business cycles. Bond covenants then have the firm adjusting its financing decisions so as to offset any risk-shifting associated with the investment decisions. Stockholders manage the asset side of the firm’s balance sheet while bondholders (regulators in the case of banks) manage the financing side. In this way the welfare of both investors is coalesced over the business cycle. A similar type of analysis accounts for the age distribution of workers, and the size distribution of firms over the business cycle. Evidence presented here and elsewhere fails to reject these predictions for the U.S. non-financial and financial corporate sectors.

In this paper we show in a thought experiment that in an economy where i) investors hold rational expectations, ii) output is generated by a linear homogeneous production function, and iii) real investment is allocated across sectors according to the CAPM, a fractional reserve banking system is not Pareto efficient and amplifies the business cycle. In developing these results we show that these three well known propositions in economics also imply a new view of the business cycle, one where the business cycle is described in terms of the dispersion of an ex-ante probability distribution. The policy implication of this analysis is that bank regulation should go further than the Volcker rule or the Vickers commission proposal by restricting bank investments to currency and deposit accounts on the central bank. Nonbank financial institutions should then carry out the financial intermediation function now carried out by banks. The paper proposes that post office banking perhaps augmented with blockchain technology sometime in the future is one way to implement the transition from fractional reserve banking to full reserve banking. While little academic work has been done on full reserve banking in the aftermath of the Great Crisis, it is interesting to note that it is part of banking reform proposals now (July 2016) before the parliament in Iceland and a special national referendum in Switzerland.

This article is a review of a 531 page book that in turn is a review and evaluation of the 2319 page Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed by Congress on July 16, 2010. The overriding theme of the book is to pose two approaches to attaining financial stability in the future. One approach is to establish a council of wise men and women supported by an army of highly skilled professional financial economists to formulate and implement regulations designed to prevent future financial crises that wreak havoc on the real economy and require financial support from taxpayers. This is the approach of the Dodd–Frank Act. The second approach proposed by the authors of this book is to design a taxing system that taxes systemically important financial institutions on the basis of their contribution to systemic risk. Borrowing ideas from the literature on the taxation of negative externalities their view is that financial institutions that create crises should pay for the clean-up. They also argue that requiring the financial polluters to pay for the creation of systemic risk will reduce the supply of systemic risk. The reader is invited to decide which approach is best.

An important maintained hypothesis in financial economics states that the average interest rate on a firm's debt is positively related to its leverage. This hypothesis has a long history going back at least to the work of Kalecki [4] where it was used to derive a determinate size for the competitive firm when the production function is homogeneous of degree one. The upward sloping interest rate-leverage relationship has also played an important role in the theory of finance. In this connection, it is somewhat interesting to find both Modigliani-Miller [5] and their many critics in complete agreement on the nature of this relationship. In particular, their statement on this subject conveys the impression that this relationship is governed by an unalterable law when they write: “Economic theory and market experience both suggest that the yields demanded by lenders tend to increase with the debt-equity ratio of the borrowing firm” [5, p. 273].

For some time there has been disagreement among financial economists as to the effect of dividend policy on the valuation of a firm under conditions of uncertainty. On one side of the debate Miller and Modigliani (MM) [11] argue that the capitalization rate on shares is independent of the dividend policy of the firm. Gordon [6], [7], [8], and others, on the other hand, reject this proposition and present theories of valuation where share prices and capitalization rates are very much dependent upon the dividend policies of firms.

J. M. Keynes' theory of portfolio management (modified and refined by Tobin)occupied an important role in his analysis of the demand for money. According to this theory, financial investors were thought to vary the composition of their portfolios between money and securities on the basis of expected yields on securities. When yields were expected to rise, investors would shift out of securities and into money. Conversely, when yields were expected to fall, investors would shift out of money and into securities. Hence, the asset, or portfolio, demand for money was argued to be negatively related to the expected yields on securities.