This study tests the tax-induced trading hypothesis as an explanation of the turn-of-the-year anomaly using Canadian and U.S. intraday data. Since the Canadian tax year-end precedes the calendar year-end by five business days, tax effects may be isolated. The authors find the anomaly is related to the degree of seller- and buyer-initiated trading and depends upon the incidence of the taxation year-end. Seller-initiated transactions (at bid prices) dominate until the tax year-end after which buyer-initiated trades (at ask prices) dominate. The anomaly is a function of bid-ask prices.

This paper examines the impact of reducing the tick size on market-making behavior on The Toronto Stock Exchange. The results indicate a significant decrease in the percentage of trades of fewer than 10,000 shares involving the upstairs traders and a significant increase in the percentage of trades of fewer than 1,000 share involving the designated market makers. Consistent with this finding, the upstairs traders earn significantly lower returns on non-block trades and the designated market markers earn lower returns on trades smaller than 1,000 shares. We conclude the tick size reduction benefits the trading public.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers, G20, G24.

This paper directly tests the hypothesis that upstairs intermediation lowers adverse selection cost. We find upstairs market makers effectively screen out information‐motivated orders and execute large liquidity‐motivated orders at a lower cost than the downstairs market. Upstairs markets do not cannibalize or free ride off the downstairs market. In one‐quarter of the trades, the upstairs market offers price improvement over the limit orders available in the consolidated limit order book. Trades are more likely to be executed upstairs at times when liquidity is lower in the downstairs market.

This study tests the tax‐induced trading hypothesis as an explanation of the turn‐of‐the‐year anomaly using Canadian and U.S. intraday data. Since the Canadian tax year‐end precedes the calendar year‐end by five business days, tax effects may be isolated. We find the anomaly is related to the degree of seller‐and buyer‐initiated trading and depends upon the incidence of the taxation year‐end. Seller‐initiated transactions (at bid prices) dominate until the tax year‐end after which buyer‐initiated trades (at ask prices) dominate. The anomaly is a function of bid‐ask prices.

This study tests the tax-induced trading hypothesis as an explanation of the turn-of-the-year anomaly using Canadian and U.S. intraday data. Since the Canadian tax year-end precedes the calendar year-end by five business days, tax effects may be isolated. We find the anomaly is related to the degree of seller-and buyer-initiated trading and depends upon the incidence of the taxation year-end. Seller-initiated transactions (at bid prices) dominate until the tax year-end after which buyer-initiated trades (at ask prices) dominate. The anomaly is a function of bid-ask prices.

This paper investigates the production technology facing computerized credit unions in Canada. A full system of translog cost equations is estimated in order to test for economies of scale, economies of scope, and other production characteristics in a multiproduct context. The regression results indicate that most of the credit unions in our sample experience significant increasing returns to scale as they expand their level of output. There is also evidence of cost complementarity or economies of scope in their mortgage and other lending activities. As a result, legislation which limits the ability of credit unions to grow and diversify will likely raise the operating costs of this important group of financial institutions. Additional structural tests of the most general translog specification suggest that none of the restrictive production conditions commonly imposed by other researchers using Cobb‐Douglas and CES specifications provide a valid representation of credit union technology. The results of many earlier studies are therefore open to question.

This paper examines the costs and determinants of order aggressiveness. Aggressive orders have larger price impacts but smaller opportunity costs than passive orders. Price impacts are amplified by large orders, small firms, and volatile stock prices. To minimize the implementation shortfall, the optimal strategy is to enter buy (sell) orders at the bid (ask). Aggressive buy (sell) orders tend to follow other aggressive buy (sell) orders and occur when bid–ask spreads are narrow and depth on the same (opposite) side of the limit book is large (small). Aggressive buys are more likely than sells to be motivated by information.