Ruixue Jia of University of California, San Diego reviews “Precarious Ties: Business and the State in Authoritarian Asia” by Meg Rithmire. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Examines trust and financial control at work in creating patterns of state-business relations in Malaysia, Indonesia, and China, exploring the strategies that authoritarian political elites adopt to manage the business class.”

This paper investigates the long-run development of China's treaty ports from the mid-eighteenth century until today. Focusing on a sample of prefectures on the coast or on the Yangtze River, I document the dynamic development paths of treaty ports and their neighbors in alternate phases of closedness and openness. I also provide suggestive evidence on migration and sector-wise growth to understand the advantage of treaty ports in the long run.

This paper studies how the abolition of an elite recruitment system—China's civil exam system that lasted over 1, 300 years—affects political stability. Employing a panel data set across 262 prefectures and exploring the variations in the quotas on the entry‐level exam candidates, we find that higher quotas per capita were associated with a higher probability of revolution participation after the abolition and a higher incidence of uprisings in 1911 that marked the end of the 2, 000 years of imperial rule. This finding is robust to various checks including using the number of small rivers and short‐run exam performance before the quota system as instruments. The patterns in the data appear most consistent with the interpretation that in regions with higher quotas per capita under the exam system, more would‐be elites were negatively affected by the abolition. In addition, we document that modern human capital in the form of those studying in Japan also contributed to the revolution and that social capital strengthened the effect of quotas on revolution participation.

We study how political hierarchy shapes regional development in China, using variations driven by regime changes during the 1000–2000 C.E. period. We find that changes in the status of the provincial capital led to the rise and decline of different prefectures as measured by population and urbanization. Two other novel findings stand out: (1) the economic advantages of the provincial capitals did not persist if they lost their political status, and (2) political hierarchy shaped economic development not only through public employment but also through the development of important infrastructure, such as transportation networks. Our findings highlight the importance of politics in determining the locations of economic activities.

We study how political hierarchy shapes regional development in China, using variations driven by regime changes during the 1000–2000 period. We find that changes in the status of the provincial capital led to the rise and decline of different prefectures as measured by population and urbanization. Two other novel findings stand out: (1) the economic advantages of the provincial capitals did not persist if they lost their political status, and (2) political hierarchy shaped economic development not only through public employment but also through the development of important infrastructure, such as transportation networks. Our findings highlight the importance of politics in determining the locations of economic activities.

This paper investigates how collusion between regulators and firms affects workplace safety using the case of China’s coal mine deaths. We argue that decentralization makes collusion more likely and that its effect is strengthened if the transaction costs of collusion are lower. These hypotheses are tested by investigating the impact of decentralization contingent on regulators’ characteristics. Exploring both decentralization and centralization reforms in the coal mine industry, we find that decentralization is correlated with an increase in coal mine death rates. Moreover, this increase in mortality is larger for the regulators with lower transaction costs (proxied by the locality of origin).

Scholars have argued that powerful individuals can exert influence on the path of a nation’s development. Yet the process through which people can have an effect on macro-level political economy outcomes remains unclear. This study uses the deadliest civil war in modern history, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), to elucidate how one person—Zeng Guofan—used his personal elite networks to organize an army to suppress the rebellion, and how these networks would affect the nation’s power distribution. Two findings stand out: (i) counties that already had more prewar elites in Zeng’s networks experienced an increase in soldier deaths after he took power; and (ii) postwar political power shifted significantly toward the home counties of these elites, creating a less balanced national-level power distribution. Our findings highlight how micro-level elite networks can influence national politics and societal power distribution, shedding new light on the relationship between elites, war, and the state.