Using the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, we examine the effect of the credibility of mandatory disclosure by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on market feedback. We find an increase in investment-price sensitivity for firms affected by the act, and the increase is enhanced when managers have greater incentives to glean information from prices—when firms are exposed to multiple dimensions of uncertainty, have higher growth options, face more competition, have less informed managers, or have higher accounting fraud risk. Our findings suggest that the greater credibility of CRA mandatory disclosure improves managerial learning from stock prices.

ABSTRACT: Recent evidence suggests that corporate tax shelters have become important corporate instruments for reducing tax burden. Based on a sample of identified tax shelter participants, I develop a profile of the type of firm that likely engages in tax sheltering. The model detects tax shelter participants through the use of variables predicted to be either affected by or associated with tax sheltering. I find that firms actively engaged in tax sheltering exhibit larger ex post book-tax differences and more aggressive financial reporting practices. Using this model of tax shelter firm characteristics, I identify a broad sample of predicted tax shelter firms from the population of firms. I then examine whether tax sheltering is associated with wealth creation for shareholders or with managerial opportunism. I find that active tax shelter firms with strong corporate governance exhibit positive abnormal returns. This finding is consistent with tax sheltering being a tool for wealth creation in well-governed firms.

ABSTRACT This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.

Commentary during the development of FASB Interpretation no. 48 suggests the interpretation could be costly for firms because new disclosure requirements could be used by the IRS to more effectively challenge uncertain tax positions. Stock returns around FIN 48 pronouncements suggest investors were not concerned about an increase in tax costs, and investors responded favorably to initial disclosures required under FIN 48. However, we document a significant negative market reaction to subsequent news of a Senate inquiry into these disclosures consistent with investors revising their beliefs over the potential for additional tax costs.

Current U.S. reporting and tax laws create an incentive for some U.S. firms to avoid the repatriation of foreign earnings, as the U.S. government charges additional corporate taxes on these transfers. Prior research suggests that the combined effect of these incentives leads some U.S. multinational corporations to hold a significant amount of cash overseas. In this study, we investigate the effect of cash trapped overseas on U.S. multinational corporations' foreign acquisitions. Consistent with expectations, we observe firms with high levels of trapped cash make less profitable acquisitions of foreign target firms using cash consideration (lower announcement window returns, lower buy and hold returns, decreased ROA ). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA) reduced this effect by allowing firms to repatriate foreign earnings held as cash abroad at a much lower tax cost. Our study has implications for current proposals to change the tax laws related to foreign earnings.

The recent economic downturn resulted in firms generating significant tax losses, which they risked losing if they experienced an ownership change. In response, a number of loss firms adopted poison pill plans. We document a significant negative market reaction to the announcement of 62 poison pill adoptions related to net operating losses (NOLs), suggesting that in general investors do not consider management׳s claim that the pills are adopted to preserve a valuable tax asset to be credible. However, we find cross-sectional variation consistent with investors considering whether a pill is legitimately adopted to preserve the NOL or to entrench management.