ABSTRACT We examine the determinants and consequences of the severity of executive compensation clawbacks. As one of the most substantial, prolonged, and controversial proposals to reform executive compensation, clawback rules recently regained the SEC's focus. We construct an intuitive clawback severity score and find that clawbacks are considerably heterogeneous and not homogenous as assumed in the literature. Our determinants analyses suggest that clawback severity is increasing in firms with greater board effectiveness and with higher cash and stock awards in director compensation. In contrast, higher director stock option compensation and more powerful CEOs attenuate the severity of clawbacks. The consequences analyses indicate that while severe clawbacks deter financial restatements, management circumvents severe clawbacks by reducing R&D expenses to avoid earnings decreases. One consistent finding throughout our analyses is that the associations are entirely driven by more severe clawbacks. However, we observe that the financial reporting benefits of severe clawbacks can be diminished by the dynamics in the boardroom. Our study extends extant clawback literature, makes a timely contribution to the SEC's decision to reinitiate discussion on clawbacks, and informs various stakeholders interested in the efficacy of clawbacks. Finally, our clawback score can be used to evaluate clawback policies.

ABSTRACT: This study examines the association between internal control deficiencies (ICDs) reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, U.S. House of Representatives 2002) and the presence of former audit partners on the audit committee who are affiliated (AFAPs) and unaffiliated (UFAPs) with the firm's external auditor. We find a negative association between AFAPs and UFAPs on the audit committee and ICDs. We also find results that suggest the NYSE and NASDAQ three-year “cooling-off” rule applying to AFAPs may be unwarranted and deserves further empirical and regulatory attention. Further tests suggest AFAPs do not allow management to circumvent the disclosure of ICDs when conditions appear to suggest this may be so, and that AFAPs are negatively related to performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. Collectively, we interpret these findings to suggest that AFAPs and UFAPs on the audit committee are associated with more effective monitoring of internal controls and financial reporting.

ABSTRACT We examine whether audit firm alma mater ties between the auditor and the audit committee (AC) are associated with significantly greater nonaudit services (NAS) provided by the auditor. We further examine whether greater NAS in the presence of such alma mater ties are associated with audit quality. Since the AC is responsible for approving and monitoring the services provided by the auditor, the presence of AC and auditor alma mater ties underscores the controversies surrounding such ties' undermining audit quality. Predicating our hypotheses on social ties theory, we find a positive association between the presence of an audit firm alumnus on the AC and NAS acquired from the alma mater auditor. We further find that this association becomes stronger as the tenure of the alumnus increases. Next, using multiple measures of audit quality, we find that, when the alumnus on the AC is associated with significantly more NAS provided by the alma mater audit firm, the quality of the audit suffers. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firm alma mater ties between the AC and auditor engender economic ties that adversely affect audit quality. Our study provides new evidence on the channels through which the quality of the audit is affected and raises important implications for the composition of the AC, auditor‐provided NAS, and client assignment to engagement partners.

ABSTRACT Although audit regulators worldwide concur that the rigor of audit firms’ internal engagement quality reviews (EQRs) is paramount to an audit firm’s audit quality, they are concerned that relationships between audit engagement partner (AEP) and engagement review partner (ERP) working in the same firm can undermine these reviews. We utilize confidential proprietary ERP and audit adjustment data to investigate how school alma mater ties between AEPs and ERPs affect audit adjustments in China. Our results reveal that audit adjustments are significantly lower when an AEP and ERP share school ties. This effect is more pronounced when the ERP is less competent than and lacks authority over the AEP, when the ERP and AEP perform mutual reviews or previously coaudited a client, and when the AEP’s work is flawed. Finally, semistructured partner interviews corroborate our empirical findings and strengthen our practical and policy implications. Data Availability: These proprietary data were provided to us with the understanding that it would be used only for independent academic research. Our research team is obligated under nondisclosure and confidentiality conditions to not disclose or share the confidential information which includes all of the data received from the data providers of the Chinese government and not to report information in any article or presentation that would inadvertently reveal (including any potential link) the identity of the partners, firms, their characteristics, and the audit adjustment data. No other restrictions were imposed by the data providers regarding the use of the data purely for academic research purposes and in communicating the research findings. Other data not subject to this confidentiality nondisclosure are available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M42.

ABSTRACT: To address potential threats to auditor independence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires the audit committee to pre-approve nonaudit services (NAS) procured from the auditor. However, the presence of a former audit firm partner (FAP) affiliated with the current auditor on the audit committee could undermine the audit committee's due diligence over the NAS pre-approval process. To alleviate such concerns, the Securities and Exchange Commission approved a three-year “cooling-off” period for appointing audit firm alumni as independent directors. Our analyses show that the presence of both affiliated and unaffiliated FAPs on audit committees does not lead to greater NAS procured from the auditor; rather, FAPs reduce NAS procured from the auditor. Moreover, NAS decline significantly following the appointment of FAPs to the audit committee. Further tests suggest the three-year cooling-off period may not be warranted and deserves further investigation. Our study raises important implications for regulators, policy makers, corporate boards, and future research. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.