We study the information production dynamics in financial markets in response to Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) announcements. We find that acquirers with low levels of pre-announcement stock price informativeness experience a substantial increase in their corresponding post-announcement stock price informativeness in response to positive Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We show that this increase is due to the enhanced prospect of deal completion. By contrast, high levels of acquirer pre-announcement stock price informativeness limit traders' incentives to search for, and acquire, new information. We also find that similar dynamics apply to the changes in acquirers' analyst coverage. Emphasizing the important role of information acquisition costs in influencing informed trading, a positive acquirer CAR increases the acquiring firm's post-announcement stock price informativeness in M&As involving public rather than private and subsidiary targets. Overall, we show that M&As have important informational consequences beyond their immediate effects on stock prices.

We show that contractionary monetary shocks, when reflecting a positive macroeconomic assessment by the Federal Reserve (hereafter “Fed”), predict an economic environment that is characterized by (a) a rise in M&A activity, (b) a higher likelihood of M&A completion, (c) larger bidder gains, (d) limited concerns about M&A overpayment, and (e) higher premia offered by foreign bidders to U.S. targets. Further, Fed information shocks have a standalone and direct causal effect on market expectations of M&A gains. That is, positive Fed information shocks trigger a positive revaluation of pending M&A. This revaluation effect, which holds after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and changes in economic forecasts, is more pronounced in deals that are relatively large, financed with stock, and have received a negative initial market reaction. Overall, our results highlight the independent and credible signaling role of the Fed in the realm of M&A.

We investigate the extent to which the scheduled release of macroeconomic indicators affects the acquirer's value in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). We find that M&As announced on days of the release of key macroeconomic indicators (i.e. indicator days) realize higher announcement period risk-adjusted returns compared to counterparts announced on non-indicator days. The positive wealth effect is due to the higher market attention on indicator days, which is particularly relevant for smaller M&As that are not usually exposed to significant investor scrutiny. The results hold after addressing self-selection bias concerns. We also find that firms announcing M&As on indicator days are more likely to “listen” to the market's feedback.

Monetary policy influences a wide range of Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) outcomes. First, an increase in the federal funds rate predicts a negative market reaction to M&A announcements, an increase in the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and significant financing challenges for the acquirer in the post-acquisition phase. Second, M&As announced during periods of high monetary policy uncertainty are associated with significant declines in acquirer value. This negative market reaction reflects a unique discount to compensate for the high riskiness of M&As in an uncertain monetary environment. Finally, we show that monetary contraction, rather than monetary policy uncertainty, is a key contributor to the decline in the aggregare M&A activity.