Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will). There is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons. We find conditions under which the unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. However, if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero.

Compensation contracts have been criticized for encouraging managers to manipulate information. This includes bonus schemes that encourage earnings smoothing, and option packages that allow managers to cash out early when the firm is overvalued. We show that the intransparency induced by these contract features is critical for giving long-term incentives. Lack of transparency makes it harder for the owner to engage in ex post optimal but ex ante inefficient liquidity provision to the manager. For the same reason, it is often optimal to “pay for luck ” (i.e., tie long-term compensation to variables that the manager has no influence over, but may have private information about, such as future profitability of the whole industry). (JEL G34, J33) How can effective executive compensation be set up when managers can manipulate short-term information? Although it is a long-standing question in corporate governance, public focus on this issue reached new heights at the beginning of the millennium after governance scandals at Enron and WorldCom and many other corporations. A common thread in these scandals was that accounting manipulation was used to increase stock prices. In a number of cases,

[Compensation contracts have been criticized for encouraging managers to manipulate information. This includes bonus schemes that encourage earnings smoothing, and option packages that allow managers to cash out early when the firm is overvalued. We show that the intransparency induced by these contract features is critical for giving long-term incentives. Lack of transparency makes it harder for the owner to engage in ex post optimal but ex ante inefficient liquidity provision to the manager. For the same reason, it is often optimal to "pay for luck" (i.e., tie long-term compensation to variables that the manager has no influence over, but may have private information about, such as future profitability of the whole industry).]

We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when these financial systems evolved during the British and German industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consider an entry model where financiers take the industrial structure as given when they lend and firms take the financial system as given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist, compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustness to coordination between lenders and borrowers.

We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when these financial systems evolved during the British and German industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consider an entry model where financiers take the industrial structure as given when they lend and firms take the financial system as given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist, compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustness to coordination between lenders and borrowers.

Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An “extremist,” who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)

We study torture as a mechanism for extracting information from a suspect who may or may not be informed. We show that a standard rationale for torture generates two commitment problems. First, the principal would benefit from a commitment to torture a suspect he knows to be innocent. Secondly, the principal would benefit from a commitment to limit the amount of torture faced by the guilty. We analyse a dynamic model of torture in which the credibility of these threats and promises is endogenous. We show that these commitment problems dramatically reduce the value of torture and can even render it completely ineffective. We use our model to address questions such as the effect of enhanced interrogation techniques, rights against indefinite detention, and delegation of torture to specialists.

Using a simple bargaining game, we investigate how strategic interactions are shaped by preferences, technology, and endowments. We study whether changes in relative military capabilities make conflicts more likely and find a nonmonotonic relationship between the cost of conflict and the probability of conflict. The game has strategic complements if the cost of conflict is small and there is a large first-mover advantage and has strategic substitutes otherwise. This characterization generates predictions regarding the use of strategic investments—for example, in defense systems. An extension of the model shows how expanding one’s territory today may increase the risk of conflict tomorrow.

A big power is facing a small power that may have developed weapons of mass destruction. The small power can create strategic ambiguity by refusing arms inspections. We study the impact of strategic ambiguity on arms proliferation and welfare. Strategic ambiguity is a substitute for actually acquiring weapons: ambiguity reduces the incentive for the small power to invest in weapons, which reduces the threat of arms proliferation. But strategic ambiguity hides information, and this can lead to costly mistakes. Cheap‐talk messages can be used to trigger inspections when such mistakes are particularly costly. Tough messages that trigger inspections always imply a greater risk of arms proliferation.

We offer a theory of polarization as an optimal response to ambiguity. Suppose individual A's beliefs first-order stochastically dominate individual B's. They observe a common signal. They exhibit polarization if A's posterior dominates her prior and B's prior dominates her posterior. Given agreement on conditional signal likelihoods, we show that polarization is impossible under Bayesian updating or after observing extreme signals. However, we also show that polarization can arise after intermediate signals as ambiguity averse individuals implement their optimal prediction strategies. We explore when this polarization will occur and the logic underlying it. (JEL D81, D82, D83)