I analyze the relationship between firm size and the extent to which executive compensation depends on the wealth of the firm's shareholders. I use a simple agency model to motivate an econometric model of this relationship. Estimating this model on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation data using nonlinear least squares, I determine that pay-performance sensitivity (as defined by Jensen and Murphy (1990b)) appears to be approximately inversely proportional to the square root of firm size (however measured). I also analyze the properties of pay- performance sensitivity for “teams” of executives working for the same firm and show it to have similar properties as CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

We generate estimates of the costs of broad-based stock option programs under varying assumptions about why firms use these pay schemes. We show that, if accounting considerations alone drive option grants, a typical firm in our sample incurs between 50 cents and one dollar of real costs in order to increase reported pre-tax net income by one dollar. This cost is reduced, but is still quite substantial, if accounting leads firms to grant options rather than restricted stock. We also show that, if option grants are efficient, the patterns in our data are consistent with firms using these grants to attract and retain employees.

Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and employee retention. We gather data from three sources on firms’ stock option grants to middle managers. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. We also conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms’ option-granting choices. We reject an incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and retention explanations appear consistent with the data.

We develop a model linking maximum damage awards available to plaintiffs in wrongful termination lawsuits, workers' propensity to sue as a function of experience, and returns to experience. Using Equal Employment Opportunity Commission data on protected-worker discrimination complaints and labor-market data from the Current Population Survey, we examine how returns to experience among protected workers changed around the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. We show that employers' reactions to employment protections may induce redistributive effects. Furthermore, these effects operate not merely across groups of differing protected status, but also within groups of identical protected status.

We identify manager/firm separations where managers quit for a new job and study abnormal returns associated with these events. Applying analyses from labor economics, we argue that the average ability of managers who resign for a similar position at another firm should be higher than that of managers who die suddenly. Controlling for age and tenure, we find that firms losing managers to other firms experience an average abnormal return of −1.51%, compared to +3.82% for firms whose managers die suddenly. We use differences in returns across groups to measure the value of differences in managerial ability.

The “Lake Wobegon Effect,” which is widely cited as a potential cause for rising CEO pay, is said to occur because no firm wants to admit to having a CEO who is below average, and so no firm allows its CEO's pay package to lag market expectations. We develop a game-theoretic model of this Effect. In our model, a CEO's wage may serve as a signal of match surplus, and therefore affect the value of the firm. We compare equilibria of our model to a full-information case and derive conditions under which equilibrium wages are distorted upward.