We show that household social connections transmit shocks that influence bank deposits. We find that counties experience an increase in bank deposits when they are more socially connected to counties affected by natural disasters. This effect is not driven by physical proximity, large disasters that attract significant media coverage, or other cross-county channels, including multimarket bank branch networks, population migration, or economic connections. Banks that collect deposits in highly socially-connected counties experience high deposit volatility, but geographic diversification reduces the volatility associated with depositor social connectedness.

Yes. We show that aggregate stock returns predict aggregate U.S. employment, despite the industrial composition of publicly traded firms differing markedly from that of all firms, and the representativeness of public firms declining over time. We also show that appropriately reweighted stock returns predict industry and local labor market outcomes. We find the strongest evidence of an alignment of interests between shareholders and workers in the manufacturing sector, despite its declining labor share of output. Our findings suggest that at quarterly frequencies, product demand shocks are more important drivers of industry- and city-level stock returns than technology shocks.

We analyze how Dodd-Frank-mandated risk retention affects the information investors extract from issuers’ retention choices in the CMBS market. We show that the required retention level is both binding and stringent. Although this implies issuers cannot signal using the level of retention, we provide a model showing that signaling can occur by varying the retention structure. The model is consistent with spreads being empirically lower in deals with a purely first-loss retention structure. A stated concern of rulemakers is asymmetric information. However, we show that, post-crisis, the level of asymmetric information in this market is quite low.

We show that commercial mortgage borrowers behave opportunistically to attempt to obtain principal reductions. We develop a model in which lenders cannot perfectly observe borrowers’ use values and renegotiation is costly. We then exploit a tax rule change that reduced the cost of renegotiation. Consistent with the model predictions, borrowers with high private use values of the property are more likely to transfer into special servicing when lenders have a higher capacity to negotiate principal reductions after the rule change. Our results suggest adverse consequences of principal forgiveness for lenders.