Analysts and insiders increase price informativeness by revealing new information to financial markets, and prior work has shown that these parties hold both firm-specific and aggregate information. This study examines how the level of informational efficiency with respect to a stock price's firm and industry-level information environment can differently mediate the information content of analyst recommendations and insider trades. I find that (1) the decrease in information revealed by insider trades is larger than that from analyst recommendations when a stock's price is more efficient with respect to firm-specific information, while (2) the increase in information revealed by analyst recommendations is larger than that from insider trades when a stock's price is less efficient with respect to industry-level information. Taken together, my results indicate that analysts (insiders) may have relative informational expertise with regards to industry (firm) information, and that both appear to rely on their specific expertise when informing prices.

This study documents a six-fold increase in short-term return reversals during earnings announcements relative to non-announcement periods. Following prior research, we use reversals as a proxy for expected returns market makers demand for providing liquidity. Our findings highlight significant time-series variation in the magnitude of short-term return reversals and suggest that market makers demand higher expected returns prior to earnings announcements because of increased inventory risks that stem from holding net positions through the release of anticipated earnings news. Collectively, our findings suggest that uncertainty regarding anticipated information events elicits predictable increases in the compensation demanded for providing liquidity and that these increases significantly affect the dynamics and information content of market prices.

Executives with poor prior performance may be inclined to take excessive risk in the hope of meeting performance targets, in which case a compensation contract featuring severance pay can be optimal. While prior work has shown that severance can induce managers to take positive NPV risks, we show that it can also keep them from taking negative NPV risks. We show that severance should be contingent on results: complete failure should nullify any payments. We also show that mandating a firm size that is larger than first-best, while costly, can help screen for good managers.

Firms in industry clusters have market prices that are more efficient than firms outside clusters. To establish causality, we analyze exogenous firm relocations and find that firms that relocate into industry clusters have higher levels of industry information in their prices. We argue that geographical proximity allows for information spillovers, reducing marginal cost to information producers. Our evidence supports this view: Analysts are more likely to cover stocks inside industry clusters, and when institutional investors have a large position in one stock in the industry cluster, they are more likely to hold other stocks in the same industry cluster.

Abstract Analyzing a panel of earnings announcers from 1998–2022, we document that the aggregate market return on quarterly earnings announcement dates is positively associated with the announcing firm’s subsequent three-day abnormal returns. This phenomenon is strongest for firms with extreme earnings surprises and dissipates by day seven, indicating a short-lived delay in incorporating the aggregate news. We also document a sluggish return response to same-day macro news disclosures, especially when earnings surprises are extreme. Effects strengthen when investors exert more effort in acquiring announcing firm information, measured by SEC EDGAR filing downloads, when macronews has a larger impact on a firm’s stock returns, when firms are smaller, and when investors’ attention and processing capacity are more constrained, proxied by retail trading. Overall, the findings support the notion that investors have finite information processing capacity and that intensive efforts to acquire firm earnings news delay the incorporation of macroeconomic news into prices.

We find that the adverse impact of bad news on analysts’ valuations is 57% larger when the CEO is Non-White, resulting in more pessimistic valuations for Non-White CEOs relative to their White counterparts. Non-White CEO firms are more likely to surpass analysts’ valuation targets in the subsequent 12 months, suggesting that this racial gap lacks economic justification. To provide further evidence of a racial bias: (1) we triangulate our empirical findings with corroborating evidence from a controlled experiment and (2) we provide evidence that analysts’ valuation disparities towards Non-White CEO firms become larger when race relations are worse. Increases in CEO familiarity attenuate these disparities, suggesting the bias we document appears to be subconscious. Our findings suggest that resources allocated towards educating a firm’s stakeholders about the potential impact of implicit racial biases and increasing self-awareness may be impactful in promoting equality within capital markets.

Abstract We study the role of CFO narcissism in the intent and ability to positively influence sell-side analysts’ perceptions of the firm. Consistent with narcissists casting favorable impressions on others, we find CFO narcissism is associated with overly optimistic analyst valuations. We then study public persuasion attempts by analyzing conference call transcripts and private persuasion attempts through a laboratory study. In the conference call setting, we show that narcissistic CFOs use more persuasive language and are more inclined to call on bearish analysts, both of which we link to price target revisions following the call. In the lab study, we simulate a one-on-one conversation and find that narcissists are especially more likely to use coercive methods to induce higher valuations from analysts. Collectively, we show that narcissistic CFOs use persuasion to favorably influence analysts’ perceptions of firm value.

ABSTRACT This study uses a controlled experiment to examine the trade‐off between managers’ use of non‐GAAP and GAAP earnings to satisfy market expectations and how this relationship can be moderated by both formal and informal regulatory attention to non‐GAAP earnings. Our key takeaway is that allowing financial reporting discretion in an alternative disclosure channel, that is, non‐GAAP earnings, can reduce firms’ opportunistic GAAP reporting. However, statements by regulators about increased attention to non‐GAAP earnings constrain this channel, and this can result in more aggressive GAAP earnings management and reduced GAAP earnings quality. We triangulate these findings with a survey and archival analyses and find results that are consistent with this primary message. Our study provides evidence relevant to standard setters and regulators that non‐GAAP measures may serve an important role even if they can be used opportunistically.

ABSTRACT We investigate the effect of CFO narcissism, as measured by signature size, on financial reporting quality. Experimentally, we validate that narcissism predicts misreporting behavior, and that signature size predicts misreporting through its association with narcissism. Empirically, we examine notarized CFO signatures and find CFO narcissism is associated with more earnings management, less timely loss recognition, weaker internal control quality, and a higher probability of restatements. The results are consistent for within‐firm comparisons focusing on CFO changes and are robust to controlling for CFO overconfidence and CEO narcissism. The results highlight the importance of CFO characteristics in the domain of financial reporting decisions.