Downstream customer firms’ bargaining power can lead to suboptimal diversification in upstream suppliers’ innovation when customers cannot commit to a long-term relationship. After the revelation of financial fraud by a major customer, suppliers surprisingly outperform a control group in terms of sales growth, Tobin’s q, and survival likelihood over a 10-year period. Our results suggest that, before a fraud revelation, supplier managers’ short decision horizons and aversion to short-term risk enable influential customers to demand relation-specific innovation, leading to suboptimal diversification. When customer importance weakens, suppliers engage in riskier and novel innovation, thereby stimulating sales growth. (JEL G14, G3, L14, L24)

We examine how ownership structure affects managerial incentive alignment mechanisms and strategic objectives. We compare large Indian firms with dispersed equity ownership with business-group affiliates operating within the same institutional frameworks. We find that the performance sensitivity of CEO pay and turnover differ significantly across group affiliates and stand-alone firms. The strategic choices of firms also differ in response to managerial incentives. However, we find that, regardless of those differences, firm performance is similar for both types of firms. Overall, this paper suggests that ownership structure and managerial incentives can adjust to optimize strategic choices and firm performance.

We study whether industrial firms risk-shift in response to distress risk increases induced through hurricane strikes. Using new proxies capturing deliberate managerial decisions about the risk of a firm’s operating segment portfolio, differences tests suggest that hurricane strikes prompt moderately, but not highly, distressed firms to skew their asset mixes toward riskier segments by shutting down low-risk, high-average-Q segments. In turn, the moderately distressed firms observe abnormally high failure rates after a hurricane strike. Employing covenant violation data, we offer further evidence that creditor control prevents highly distressed firms from raising their risk. Our conclusions extend those of other studies by suggesting that moderate distress risk levels can lead the managers of industrial firms to not only engage in risk-taking, but, in fact, in risk-shifting.

This paper investigates the role of stakeholder preference on corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. Using a staggered difference-in-difference approach, we show that Indian firms increase CSR expenses when trade restrictions (Antidumping) are initiated against competing Chinese exports from countries with a high stakeholder preference for CSR. However, when these shocks emanate from countries with a lower stakeholder preference, CSR expenses remain unchanged. Capital expenditure and R&D of Indian firms increase following AD shocks, irrespective of their country of origin. Finally, CSR increases firm value only when the demand shocks originate from countries with a higher CSR preference. Collectively, we provide evidence for consumer-driven CSR strategies.

We develop a dynamic model of a firm in which cash management is partially delegated to a self-interested manager. Shareholders trade off the cost of dismissing the manager with the cost of managerial discretion over the use of liquid funds. An improvement in corporate governance quality may have a positive or a negative effect on levels and values of cash balances, depending on the source of the improvement. While a reduction of managerial entrenchment results in lower cash balances and mostly higher marginal cash values, we demonstrate that the opposite is true when the monitoring of managerial actions becomes more effective. A managerial asset substitution problem produces a novel hump-shaped relation between the firm's liquidity levels and the collective propensity of shareholders and managers to reduce cash flow risk. We also discuss the firm's risk management strategies as well as derive implications of the presence of an investment opportunity, debt financing, and shareholder activism.

We model the dynamics of going public within an IPO wave. The model predicts that firms with better growth opportunities can find it optimal to go public early and accept underpricing of their issues to signal quality. Data supports this prediction as, on average, early movers underprice their issues significantly more and we show that leaders (early movers with high underpricing) obtain much higher valuations when going public than other IPO firms. Furthermore, after going public, leaders invest significantly more, their sales grow faster, and their profitability remains higher compared to other IPO firms.

In this article, we show that only distressed firms not identified as distressed by creditors are able to transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders. Using the number of years to future bankruptcy as a proxy for genuine distress and measures based on observable firm characteristics as proxies for perceived distress, genuinely distressed firms incorrectly perceived as healthy cut payouts to shareholders more slowly and invest more aggressively as uncertainty increases than correctly identified distressed firms. Consistent with the idea that incorrectly identified distressed firms actively hide their troubles, we show that they tend to follow more aggressive accounting policies and often resort to earnings misstatements. We also show that they are often not restricted by covenants and can borrow further debt capital at affordable rates, suggesting that a lack of monitoring by creditors allows them to transfer wealth to shareholders.

ABSTRACT Firms in bilateral relationships are likely to produce or procure unique products—especially when they are in durable goods industries. Consistent with the arguments of Titman and Titman and Wessels, such firms are likely to maintain lower leverage. We compile a database of firms' principal customers (those that account for at least 10% of sales or are otherwise considered important for business) from the Business Information File of Compustat and find results consistent with the predictions of this theory.

ABSTRACT We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks.” Disclosure by close peers—especially those with co‐coverage and co‐ownership links—also increases following fraud revelation. Although disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.