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Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(1), 119-137
We report market experiments in which human traders are replaced by "zero-intelligence" programs that submit random bids and offers. Imposing a budget constraint (i.e., not permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their values) is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent. Allocative efficiency of a double auction derives largely from its structure, independent of traders' motivation, intelligence, or learning. Adam Smith's invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought; it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality.

Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality

Journal of Political Economy 1993 101(1), 119-137
This paper reports market experiments in which human traders are replaced by "zero-intelligence" programs that submit random bids and offers. Imposing a budget constraint (i.e., n ot permitting traders to sell below their costs or buy above their valu es) is sufficient to raise the allocative efficiency of these auctions close to 100 percent. Allocative efficiency of a double auction deri ves largely from its structure, independent of traders' motivation, intelligence, or learning. Adam Smith's invisible hand may be more powerful than some may have thought; it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality.

Indeterminacy of Equilibria in a Hyperinflationary World: Experimental Evidence

Econometrica 1993 61(5), 1073
The authors design and study an OLG experimental economy where the government finances a fixed real deficit through seigniorage. The economy has continua of nonstationary rational expectations equilibria and two stationary rational expectations equilibria. The authors do not observe nonstationary rational expectations paths. Observed paths tend to converge close to, or somewhat below, the low inflation stationary state. The adaptive learning hypothesis is consistent with the data in selecting the low inflation stationary state rational expectations equilibrium as a long-run stationary equilibrium. Nevertheless, simple adaptive learning models do not capture the market uncertainty or the biases observed in the data.