This paper studies distinctions between fixed-price and Dutch auction self-tenders for common stock. We find that fixed-price tenders pay higher premiums to retire greater equity fractions than Dutch offers yet generate similar total returns to stockholders. Accordingly, total returns are significantly higher in Dutch auctions after controlling for tender and firm characteristics. In addition, wealth transfers to owners of repurchased shares are significantly higher in fixed-price offers. The Dutch mechanism thus appears to induce increases in firm value with smaller disbursals of cash. These cost savings to investors who maintain their ownership may explain the popularity of the new technique.

In 1985 the Delaware Supreme Court allowed the Unocal Corporation to make a tender offer for its own shares to all holders except Mesa Partners II, who were attempting to gain control of Unocal. The Unocal decision and Mesa's response are associated with abnormal losses for shareholders of other Delaware firms that appeared to be targets of hostile takeover attempts at the time. These losses suggest that investors believed the decision would increase Delaware managers' ability to resist takeovers to the disadvantage of target shareholders.

The focus of this paper i s on the escape clause petitions filed under the Trade Act of 1974 (Section 201). First, the capital marketevent study method is used to analyze the effects of protection decisions. Then, cross-section regressions are performed to examine the influence of key variables on the observed market reaction. The authors conc lude that while protection is beneficial to beleaguered industries, the extent o f such benefits is quite narrowly circumscribed and is conditional on internal v ariables for each firm. Protection is thus not the panacea that its advocates cl aim. Copyright 1986 by MIT Press.