To examine the market response to positive revelations of chief executive officer (CEO) quality, this study focuses on CEOs who withdraw acquisition bids when the price becomes increasingly expensive. Firms that withdrawal for price-related reasons earn higher withdrawal returns than firms that withdraw for other reasons. This relation is stronger when CEO uncertainty and discretion is high. CEOs unwilling to increase the offer price are less likely to be replaced and more likely to advance to a larger firm than a control group of CEOs. The finding that the market attaches value to CEO-specific information suggests that unobservable manager characteristics can meaningfully impact firm outcomes.

We study block trades in the corporate bond market, where dealers buy or sell blocks from initiating customers and offset their positions with receiving investors. Our findings indicate that while receivers benefit from trading cost savings, they primarily bear adverse selection costs and experience worse outcomes when informed trading is prevalent. Mandatory trade reporting improves receiver outcomes by revealing dealers’ private information, but the benefits are reduced when reporting is delayed. Our results emphasize the importance of transparency regime design and suggest potential market fragility: if information asymmetry becomes severe, receivers may withdraw from the block market.

ABSTRACT Do fast, competitive markets yield liquidity measurement problems when using the popular Monthly Trade and Quote (MTAQ) database? Yes. MTAQ yields distorted measures of spreads, trade location, and price impact compared with the expensive Daily Trade and Quote (DTAQ) database. These problems are driven by (1) withdrawn quotes, (2) second (versus millisecond) time stamps, and (3) other causes, including canceled quotes. The expensive solution, using DTAQ, is first‐best. For financially constrained researchers, the cheap solution—using MTAQ with our new Interpolated Time technique, adjusting for withdrawn quotes, and deleting economically nonsensical states—is second‐best. These solutions change research inferences.

Why is the mere announcement of an open-market share repurchase program, which involves no commitment to purchase shares, regarded as good news by the market? We develop a theoretical model to resolve this puzzle. The model predicts that firms with large underpricing can attract attention from speculators by announcing repurchases, and the subsequent trades from these speculators lead to value corrections. Firms with small underpricing, however, cannot attract attention by announcing repurchases, and these firms have to use costly share repurchases as a value-correcting signal. We then provide empirical evidence corroborating the predictions of the theoretical model.

Bond underwriters, lacking “Greenshoe options” and formal systems to track “flipping” activity, have fewer tools than equity underwriters to manage secondary market order flow uncertainty. We show that bond underwriters respond by selectively “overallocating” some issues to attain net short positions. Overallocations are economically substantive, facilitate the syndicate's price stabilization efforts, and are largely offset in the days after issuance. These issues on average experience more net selling by institutional investors and, despite large syndicate purchases, appreciate less in the secondary market. Thus, overallocation is an observable indicator that underwriters anticipate weakness in net secondary market demand.

ABSTRACT We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.

ABSTRACT Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) computed around acquisition announcements are widely considered to be market‐based assessments of expected value creation. We show, however, that announcement returns do not correlate with commonly used and new measures of ex post outcomes. A simple characteristics‐based model using standard information known at the announcement date can predict these outcomes reasonably well, yet CAR even fails to capture the predictions from this model. Evidence suggests that information about the stand‐alone acquirer dominates CAR, making it virtually impossible to extract deal‐related information. We conclude that CAR is an unreliable measure of expected value creation.