This paper analyzes the market for syndicated loans, a hybrid of private and public debt, which has grown at well over a 20% rate annually over the past decade and which totaled over $1 trillion in 1997. We identify empirically the factors that influence a bank or nonbank's decision to syndicate a loan and the determinants of the proportion of the loan sold in the event of syndication. The evidence reveals a loan is more likely to be syndicated as information about the borrower becomes more transparent, as the syndicate's managing agent becomes more “reputable”, and as the loan's maturity increases. The lead manager holds larger proportions of information-problematic loans in its own portfolio. Loan syndications, like loan sales, appear to be motivated, in part, by capital regulations, and the liquidity position of the agent bank influences the likelihood of syndication, but not the extent. Our results confirm that information and agency problems affect the salability of debt claims and the extent to which a loan is “transaction oriented” rather than “relationship oriented” in the sense of A. Boot and A. Thakor (2000, J. Finance54, 679–713). Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G20, G21, G24.

We study the impact of bank board structure as a signaling mechanism in loan syndication. We find that the quality of the lead arranger’s board, and specifically the monitoring quality of the board, has a positive effect on the ability to syndicate a loan. The impact of board quality is separate and distinct from lead arranger reputation. Board monitoring quality plays a more important role when the borrower and lead arranger have no prior relationship, after the bankruptcy of an existing borrower, and during the financial crisis. We posit that one channel for our findings is through board oversight of the CEO, and we provide evidence that CEO quality partially mediates the relationship between board quality and loan syndication. Overall, we conclude the quality of the lead arranger’s board, as a separate and distinct effect to reputation, serves as a credible signal to participant banks, mitigating moral hazard and adverse selection concerns.