Abstract This paper makes four contributions to the literature relating accounting choices to CEO compensation. First, it shows that discretionary accruals are associated with CEO cash compensation, a result that holds after controlling for both the nondiscretionary components of income and increases in shareholder wealth. Although significant, the coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly lower than that on nondiscretionary accruals, which in turn is significantly lower than the coefficient on operating cash flows. Second, the paper shows a differential reaction to positive and negative discretionary accruals —‐ the association between positive discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation is significantly greater than the association between negative discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. Third, the paper shows the association between discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. In particular, when positive discretionary accruals allow the firm to reduce or avoid a loss, the association between CEO cash compensation and discretionary accruals is significantly greater. Finally, this paper shows that the association of CEO cash compensation with reported income generally increases with the level of discretionary accruals, consistent with management responding to the incentives provided.

Equity compensation provides incentives for executives to remain with the firm to avoid forfeiture of restricted shares and some or all of the value of stock options held. Empirically we show that the intrinsic value of unexercisable in-the-money options, the time value of unexercised options, and the value of restricted shares are inversely related to voluntary executive turnover. These findings which are most pronounced for strong performers, hold for CEOs and non-CEOs alike. While paying excess cash compensation also reduces turnover, the effect is less pronounced than that of equity compensation.

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Research shows female directors are associated with proxies for improved monitoring, yet finds mixed results as to their effect on firm performance. Hypothesizing that their performance impact depends on the firms' information environment, we find that independent female directors have a negative (positive) effect on performance in opaque (transparent) firms, an effect which is incremental to that of independent male directors. We then explore the channels which drive this finding. The standard measure of the information environment considers opacity from the view of external parties such as analysts and investors. However, independent directors have greater access to information than external parties. Consequently, we investigate whether additional data sources, if they exist, mitigate the impact of “external” opacity on the effect of independent female directors on firm performance. We find that when independent female directors have greater access to information either from sources inside, e.g., an independent board chair, or outside, e.g., a large network, the firm, their negative effect on performance in opaque firms dissipates. Investigating their positive impact in transparent firms, we find that independent female directors decrease both discretionary accruals and the likelihood of an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement release.

The release of the full set of financial statements in Form 10–Q provides investors with the data necessary to estimate the discretionary portion of earnings, thereby allowing them to better assess the integrity of reported quarterly earnings. We thus expect a negative association between unexpected discretionary accruals estimated using 10–Q disclosures and stock returns around 10–Q filing dates. Consistent with our expectations, we document a negative association between unexpected discretionary accruals and cumulative abnormal returns over a short window around the 10–Q filing date. Furthermore, this association varies systematically with investor sophistication. Finally, results from portfolio tests indicate that this association is economically as well as statistically significant. One interpretation of our findings is that accruals management has substantial valuation consequences, which are quickly impounded into stock prices.

Outside board chairs are more likely in firms that are smaller, have greater stock volatility and research and development intensity, and have a lower proportion of inside directors and less institutional ownership; they are also more likely when chief executive officers have shorter tenure and lower ownership. We also find that the existence of an outside chair is associated with geographical and industry norms. An outside chair is positively associated with firm performance, a finding robust to various estimation methods, including event study and multivariate analyses incorporating controls for endogeneity, as well as market and accounting measures of performance. We note, however, that the relationship between outside chair and firm performance varies with firm characteristics.

Implementation methods mandated by the FASB allow firms to report equity-increasing changes as income and equity-decreasing changes as adjustments to stockholders' equity. These findings are consistent with the argument that the FASB, to reduce its political costs, attempts to minimize firms' costs of implementation. We find that the FASB permits flexibility in timing of adoption of mandated changes. Firms experiencing lower changes in return on assets (ROA) before adoption and expecting higher adoption income effects accelerate implementation. Early adopters select the year of adoption when their change in ROA is lowest and their change in leverage is highest.

ABSTRACT In this paper we show that supporters reduce donations to nonprofits subsequent to disclosure of high executive compensation. We find evidence consistent with large, sophisticated donors actively seeking out and reacting to compensation information made available in IRS Form 990, while smaller donors react to compensation disclosures in the media. Additional analysis indicates that these results vary systematically across nonprofits, as we find a stronger negative relation in nonprofits classified as more charitable, and a weaker relation in nonprofits that provide services to their donors. In contrast neither grantors nor patrons appear to react to executive compensation disclosures. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources.

Abstract In 2008, the IRS added several schedules to Form 990, including Schedule R, related party transactions. Utilizing Schedule R, we investigate and descriptively document the existence of related parties and the types of transactions engaged in with those related parties. Then, to provide evidence of the usefulness of these disclosures, we tie into the literature on financial reporting quality. Prior research into financial reporting quality shows that donors discount program ratios when a nonprofit organization reports zero fundraising expenses, implying that they find reporting zero fundraising expenses to be a proxy for poor financial reporting quality. A plausible reason for organizations reporting zero fundraising expenses is that a related party conducts fundraising on the organization's behalf. Consistent with this interpretation, we find that when nonprofits disclose that fundraising services are provided by a related entity, they are more likely to report zero fundraising expenses. We also find that disclosure of related party fundraising mitigates donor discounting of the program ratio when zero fundraising expenses are reported. However, we only find that this mitigation occurs in nonprofits with sophisticated donors. In sum, we find evidence consistent with donors—in particular, sophisticated donors—using disclosures provided in Form 990 to supplement the amounts recognized. Our findings demonstrate the importance of, and are consistent with the use of, these related party disclosures. On a broader level, these findings provide insight into how thoroughly donors are willing to review Form 990 to get information relevant to their donation decision.